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BEYOND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:   
WHEN THE SUPREME COURT IS NO LONGER A COURT 
Margaret L. Moses* 
The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited pow-
ers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they 
are imposed. 
—Marbury v. Madison1 
 
Our Supreme Court, in recent decisions, has reached out beyond the cases that were put before it by 
litigants to decide issues that were not in dispute between the parties.  The four Supreme Court 
decisions discussed in this Article, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Montejo v. Louisiana, and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, have 
frequently been criticized because of the changes in law they effected; this Article, however, focuses 
on the process.  When the Court decides its own questions, rather than those presented by the 
parties, it does so without the benefit of a record created below on the question, without the 
opinions of lower court judges, and sometimes without the briefing of the issue by the parties or 
amici.  In the cases discussed, the Court has also ignored traditional prudential practices, such as 
the avoidance canon for constitutional issues, the refusal to consider issues neither pressed nor 
passed upon below, and the rejection of issues raised for the first time in respondents’ merits brief.  
It has also failed to follow its own Court Rules.  In effect, the Supreme Court has acted without 
boundaries of any kind.  In so doing, it is not acting as a court.  This Article proposes that there 
should be boundaries that the Court is required to meet, and that those boundaries should be 
imposed by Congress, under the Exceptions Clause of Article III.  The purpose would be to make 
judicial conduct consistent with the structure that the Constitution sets forth for the role of the 
judiciary.  To the extent that no boundaries exist, the Justices become simply politicians in robes. 
 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  I wish to thank participants 
in the Constitutional Law Colloquium at Loyola Chicago where I presented an earlier 
version of this paper.  I also wish to thank Professors George Anastaplo, Paul Carrington, 
Robert Jones, Charles Murdock, John Nowak, Juan Perea, Barry Sullivan, Spencer Waller, 
and Michael Zimmer, as well as Loyola Chicago faculty members at a Works in Progress 
Workshop for their insights and helpful comments. 
 1 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).  See David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence?  
Original Intentions and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1074–75 
(2006) (“What . . . receives inadequate attention in commentaries, is [Marshall’s] belief 
that the courts must keep to their proper sphere.  Neither jurors nor judges should roam 
at will.  Marshall was painfully clear about the existence of outer boundaries to the judi-
ciary’s powers.  He understood the theory and utility of separated and divided pow-
ers . . . . Marshall’s defense of a limited power of judicial review has virtually disappeared 
from accounts of his jurisprudence.”). 
162 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 162 
I. WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF A COURT? ............................. 167 
A. Constitutional and Historical Perspective .................... 167 
B. Some Current Perspectives ............................................ 170 
II. REACHING OUT IN THE CASES ............................................... 174 
A. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission .................. 175 
1. Background ............................................................. 177 
2. Supreme Court Decision ........................................ 179 
B. Ashcroft v. Iqbal ................................................................ 182 
1. Background ............................................................. 183 
2. Supreme Court Decision ........................................ 184 
C. Montejo v. Louisiana ........................................................ 188 
1. Background ............................................................. 189 
2. Supreme Court Decision ........................................ 190 
D. Gross v. FBL Financial ..................................................... 194 
1. Background ............................................................. 195 
2. Supreme Court Decision ........................................ 197 
E. Advisory Opinions .......................................................... 201 
F. Summary ......................................................................... 202 
III. CAN THE SUPREME COURT’S CONDUCT BE LIMITED? ........... 203 
A. The Problem .................................................................. 204 
B. Judging the Judges ......................................................... 205 
C. What Congress Could Do .............................................. 211 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 214 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The judicial branch of the government, sometimes referred to as 
the “least dangerous branch,”2 has in recent times demonstrated that 
it may not warrant this description.  In the cases discussed below, the 
Court has reached out to decide issues that were not presented by the 
litigants as part of cases or controversies they brought to the Court.  
In so doing, the Court has decided issues that were not based on a 
record below, had not been the subject of decisions by lower courts, 
and sometimes had not even been briefed by parties or amici.  In 
making these decisions, the Court appears to have seen the cases 
 
 2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); see 
also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1986). 
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simply as vehicles for changing the law in a way that a majority of the 
Court felt was desirable.  When the Court decides issues in this way, it 
no longer acts as a court. 
The role of courts is to decide real disputes between parties and 
honestly tell them, and us, why they decided the case the way they 
did.  Courts must also act with regularity and consistency.  They must 
support the rule of law.  They develop and must follow traditional, 
prudential guidelines for organizing and accomplishing their work.  
They must follow precedent or explain why they have decided not to, 
and must act with integrity and fairness, and with a recognition of the 
awesome power they hold.  They cannot be just politicians in robes. 
As H. Jefferson Powell has noted: 
The Court plays its part in the system only when its members make it 
clear through their words that they are genuinely engaged with the hard 
issues before them, and that they are being honest with themselves and 
with us about the considerations that drive them.  Only when their opi-
nions seek to persuade our judgments, not just coerce our wills, can the 
decisions of the court truly be called authoritative.3 
The Court no longer acts as a court when it changes the nature of the 
case the parties brought in order to create an opportunity to change 
the law, when it reaches out to decide issues not properly before it 
and not based on a record or decisions below, and when it is less than 
candid about its reasoning. 
The Framers of the Constitution, particularly Alexander Hamil-
ton, argued that the judiciary was the least dangerous of the three 
branches because its power was the most limited.4  The primary limi-
tation was the constitutional requirement that judges could only de-
cide cases and controversies brought to them by others.5  Judges were 
not free simply to opine on legislation or policy unless a specific case 
was put before them by particular litigants.  Judges were also limited 
by existing law and judicial practice, including principles of stare de-
cisis.  Although the Framers recognized that judges would have some 
leeway of interpretation, they argued that the judiciary was too weak 
to exercise that leeway to usurp legislative authority.6 
 
 3 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE:  THE MORAL DIMENSION OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION 108–09 (2008). 
 4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2. 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 6 Hamilton believed that the judiciary would be limited by “the general nature of the judi-
cial power, . . . the objects to which it relates, . . . the manner in which it is exer-
cised, . . . [and] its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force.”  THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 81, supra note 2, at 484. 
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While much has been written on the subject of whether and when 
the Supreme Court usurps legislative power, with many different 
perspectives voiced, this Article argues that in at least one instance, 
there is a rather clear line beyond which it is improper for the Court 
to go.  The Court should not reach out for issues that are not proper-
ly before it in order either to overturn prior cases it dislikes or to 
create new law serving the Court’s policy preferences.  The Court is 
no longer engaged in appellate review when it decides issues that 
have not come before the Court by means of the adversarial process.  
Yet, in the last few years, the Court’s current conservative majority has 
done exactly that.  This Court does not, of course, represent the only 
examples of the Supreme Court reaching out to decide issues that 
were not squarely put before it by the parties.  Prior Courts, both lib-
eral and conservative, have also on occasion reached out for issues 
that became a basis for circumventing the doctrine of stare decisis 
and overturning precedent.7  The purpose in each case appeared to 
be achieving a particular change in the law sought by the majority of 
Justices.  This Article argues that regardless of the political persuasion 
of the majority, it is improper for Justices to change the case before 
them in order to change the law. 
As the cases discussed below will demonstrate, the current Court 
not only appears to have a strong disregard for precedent or any limi-
tation on the scope of its power, it also reaches out for issues not 
properly before it specifically to overturn precedent it does not like.8  
 
 7 For example, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S 643 (1961), the Warren Court reached out to over-
rule Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had validated the well-settled state court 
procedure of admitting illegally seized evidence.  Ms. Mapp had appealed the constitu-
tionality of a statute pertaining to possession of obscene materials.  The parties had not 
raised the issue of excluding evidence because of a lack of a warrant.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 
645.  Yet the Court reached out beyond the issues the parties had put before it and over-
ruled Wolf on the ground that the exclusionary rule applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 672.  For further discussion of this case, see LUCAS A. 
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 195–99 (2000).  Mapp, however, 
came up on an appeal, rather than by the certiorari process.  An example from the 
Rehnquist Court is Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), a school desegregation case.  
Justice Souter criticized the majority as follows:  
No one on the Court has had the benefit of briefing and argument informed by 
an appreciation of the potential breadth of the ruling.  The deficiencies from 
which we suffer have led the Court effectively to overrule a unanimous constitu-
tional precedent of 20 years’ standing, which was not even addressed in argument, 
was mentioned merely in passing by one of the parties, and discussed by another 
of them only in a misleading way. 
  Id. at 139. 
 8 Criticism has come from both liberals and conservatives.  See Barry Friedman, The Wages of 
Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 nn.2 & 
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The Court’s reach beyond the scope of issues fairly presented to it 
cannot be justified by the end result, whether sought by liberal Justic-
es or conservative ones.  When the Court engages in such conduct, it 
is overstepping its judicial role and acting more like a legislative body.  
Although a court may make policy as well as law, it needs to do so 
within the confines of an adversarial system, involving particular cases 
and controversies put before it by litigants.  The Court’s conduct with 
respect to the cases discussed in this Article raises serious questions 
about its adherence to the structure of the Constitution.  That struc-
ture was meant to impose a system of controls by way of checks and 
balances and separation of powers.9  When the Court ignores the 
constitutional structure, it is acting without any controls. 
It is probably not surprising that the Court appears to have so lit-
tle concern about boundaries imposed by Article III on the proper 
role of the judiciary in light of Congress’s cooperation over the years 
in giving the Court authority over its docket and rules of procedure.10  
To the extent that the Court views its power as unlimited, however, it 
risks becoming the most dangerous, rather than the least dangerous 
branch.11  This Article proposes that Congress should better define 
the scope of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by adopting legislation 
under the Exceptions Clause of Article III.12  Such legislation would 
give force to the case or controversy requirement.  It would prevent 
the Supreme Court from deciding issues that have not been pre-
sented to it by litigants through an adversary process. 
The Article looks at recent Supreme Court conduct from a struc-
tural approach that is consistent with a recent turn in constitutional 
 
3 (2010) (citing criticism of the Court’s lack of respect for precedent by Robert Bork, Ri-
chard Posner, Bruce Fein, Ronald Dworkin, and Geoffrey Stone). 
 9 See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”:  The Need for Pragmatic 
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 466 (1991) (“[W]hatever its 
faults, separation of powers provides the optimum methodology for attaining the goal of 
assuring the maintenance of popular sovereignty and individual liberty.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 662 (virtually eliminating the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction); Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall 
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure.”); Judiciary Act of 
1925, 43 Stat. 936 (giving the Court control over most of its work). 
 11 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 9, at 453 (“[T]he separation of powers provisions of the 
Constitution are tremendously important, . . . because the fears of creeping tyranny that 
underlie them are at least as justified today as they were at the time the Framers estab-
lished them.”). 
 12 “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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scholarship.13  For example, Bruce Ackerman has lately shifted his 
scholarship from what he now characterizes as American “triumphal-
ism”—that our structure of government is exceptional, in need only 
of tweaking—toward a critique of the dangers associated with the 
structure of presidential power.14  In his view, the structure of separa-
tion of powers in the Constitution no longer works to constrain the 
three branches of government.  The President’s power has become 
essentially unbounded.15  Somewhat earlier, Sandy Levinson turned 
his scholarly focus to the many failures of all three of our constitu-
tional institutions, which, in his view, undermine democracy.16  The 
point of this Article is that the structure of the Constitution has had 
no restraining effect on the present Supreme Court majority, which 
appears to be conducting itself without boundaries or accountability.  
Part I of the Article will focus on the role of the Court as envisioned 
by the Framers, and as disputed in modern times. Part II will consider 
four recent cases in which the Supreme Court reached out to decide 
issues that were not presented to it for decision by the litigants, and 
in the process ignored basic prudential practices and its own Court 
Rules.  Finally, Part III will discuss new normative legal theories that 
provide support for critiquing the Court’s conduct as failing to comp-
ly with its obligations.  It will also propose that Congress use the Ex-
ceptions Clause of Article III17 to limit the Court’s jurisdiction, and 
help remedy the Court’s present tendency to overstep the boundaries 
established in the constitutional structure. 
 
 13 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 928–29 (2011) (arguing that structural safeguards of Article I provide effective limits 
on Congress’s authority under Article III to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court). 
 14 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1–7 (2010). 
 15 See id. at 184–88. 
 16 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); see also, Redish & Ci-
sar, supra note 9, at 452 (“[T]he Court’s enforcement of . . . [separation of powers] needs 
to become considerably more vigorous than it has been in the recent past.”).  Current 
analysis tends to draw upon the practice of making inferences from constitutional struc-
ture, as discussed in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–32 (1969).  See, e.g., Grove, supra note 13, at 880 n.45. 
 17 See supra note 12. 
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I.  WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF A COURT? 
A.  Constitutional and Historical Perspective 
To understand when the Supreme Court’s actions may go beyond 
its proper powers, one must consider the source of its powers.  The 
United States Constitution, in Article III, section 2, provides that the 
judicial power extends to cases and controversies.18  This section thus 
provides both for judicial power and for a limitation on that power.  
The Supreme Court has power to decide cases and controversies, but 
such power is limited solely to those questions that are presented to it 
by the parties to an actual case or controversy.19  The Court itself has 
recently recognized that: 
[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our 
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court 
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . This is because “[t]he judicial power of the United States defined by 
Art. III is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutio-
nality of legislative or executive acts.”  The federal courts are not empo-
wered to seek out and strike down any governmental act that they deem 
to be repugnant to the Constitution.  Rather, federal courts sit “solely, to 
decide on the rights of individuals,” and “must ‘refrain from passing 
upon the constitutionality of an act. . . . unless obliged to do so in the 
proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised 
by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.’”20 
The requirement that an actual case or controversy must be at issue 
before the Court has the power to act is closely tied to separation of 
powers under the Constitution.  The Court itself has explained that 
the “words [cases and controversies] define the role assigned to the 
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of powers to assure that the federal 
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of 
government.”21  The case or controversy rule “limit[s] the business of 
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a 
 
 18 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under 
their Authority; . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to Con-
troversies between two or more States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 19 The Court has developed justiciability doctrines that further limit judicial power, such as 
standing, ripeness, mootness, the political question doctrine, and a prohibition on advi-
sory opinions.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
49–53 (3d ed. 2006). 
 20 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 21 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
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form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.”22 
The case or controversy requirement makes clear that the Court’s 
function is to decide and remedy violations of laws, and enjoin and 
redress constitutional violations.23  Limitations on the Court’s powers 
were intended to prevent the unelected judiciary from intruding 
upon the power of the legislative branch to create laws or the power 
of the executive to enforce them.  According to the Framers, the ina-
bility of the Court to exercise power beyond justiciable controversies 
brought to it for decision would prevent abuses and judicial over-
reaching.24  The Framers wanted to ensure that the Court had no in-
volvement in the legislative act of creating laws.  Their fear of judicial 
overreaching into the legislature’s prerogatives is readily seen in the 
repeated rejection by the Constitutional Convention of 1787 of a 
proposed Council of Revision, which would have been composed of 
the President and members of the judiciary.25  As proposed, the 
Council’s task would have been to review and possibly veto federal 
laws before they would go into effect.26  The Constitutional Conven-
tion rejected the Council in order to ensure complete separation of 
the courts from the legislature.27  The insistence on separation 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19. 
 24 The argument ultimately won over the Anti-Federalists, who had feared that judges—with 
power to interpret the Constitution—would substitute their will for that of the people, 
create law, and undermine state interests by interpretations favoring the federal govern-
ment.  See Essays of Brutus, No. XI, N.Y.J., Jan 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 358, 420 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 25 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism:  Restriking the Balance Between Judicial 
Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2004) (“[T]he Founders em-
braced this ‘case and controversy’ restriction on judicial power not only by including the 
‘case and controversy’ language in Article III, but also by repeatedly rejecting proposals 
for a ‘Council of Revision,’ which would have empowered select judges, working with the 
executive, to review pending legislation at will without waiting for injured parties to file a 
lawsuit upon being subjected to the new law.  By rejecting the Council of Revision and by 
including the ‘case and controversy’ restriction, the Founders helped to ensure that judi-
cial intrusions into the political realm would be limited.”). 
 26 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (W.W. Norton & Co., 
Inc., 1987 (1787).  
 27 See James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1989) (“The history of [the Council of Revision] proposal illu-
strates how the Framers, faced with a model of judicial involvement in the lawmaking 
process, chose instead a judiciary that took no part in the creation of laws.  In so doing, 
the Framers effectively chose to preclude the courts from deciding matters of public poli-
cy and to create a special place for the courts in the separation of powers scheme.”).  
Moreover, the Framers believed that the limitation of judicial power to cases and contro-
versies also incorporated other restraints on judicial power, particularly by means of the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  In deciding cases and controversies, courts were expected be 
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stemmed from fear that any participation by the judiciary in any way 
in the legislative process would give it too much power.28 
Thus, the requirement that the Court can only resolve cases and 
controversies properly brought before it by litigants was expected to 
keep judicial powers separate from those of the other two branches of 
government.  This requirement provides the most basic structural pa-
rameter for the proper role of the Court. 
One might argue that the “case or controversy” requirement re-
fers to cases, and not to issues within those cases, and that the Justices 
can raise related issues not presented by the parties.29  While this may 
be reasonable in certain instances, it should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances.  The Supreme Court Rules themselves limit the possi-
bility of raising issues not included within the questions presented by 
the parties, requiring that “[o]nly the questions set out in the peti-
tion, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”30  It 
would thus appear contrary to the Court Rules for the Court to con-
sider a question not fairly included within the petition for a writ of 
certiorari.31  The reasons for this rule are to enable the Court to know 
what is involved in the case, to have the questions that are raised in 
the case tested by the adversary process before certiorari is granted, 
 
guided by precedent.  As Hamilton noted, “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, 
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 2, at 470. 
 28 See id.  Moreover, when then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson asked the Supreme 
Court for an advisory opinion interpreting the country’s obligation under its separate 
treaty obligations with England and France, when those two countries were at war with 
each other, the Court declined to provide it.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 54–55.  
The Justices explained they could not do so without violating the separation of powers 
and thus their limited power to decide only cases and controversies.  See id. 
 29 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1981) (“An order limiting the 
grant of certiorari does not operate as a jurisdictional bar.  We may consider questions out-
side the scope of the limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the 
proper disposition of the case.”). 
 30 SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a). 
 31 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (“[W]e ordinarily do not consider 
questions outside those presented in the petition for certiorari.  This rule [Court Rule 
14.1(a)] is prudential in nature but we disregard it only in the most exceptional cas-
es . . . .” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  Although one might argue that the 
Rule is meant to bind litigants but not the Court itself, there is nothing in the text of Rule 
14.1(a) that would suggest this.  Rule 14.1(a) of the Supreme Court Rules provides in 
pertinent part, “The statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein.  Only the questions set out in the petition or 
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”  SUP. CT. R. 14(a).  The perti-
nent policy reasons behind the rule, that the parties and amici should be adequately in-
formed in advance of the issues that are to be decided, would support having the rule ap-
ply both to the Court as well as to the parties. 
170 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
and to ensure that an adequate record was made in the lower courts 
with respect to the questions presented.  As the Court has noted: 
Prudence . . . dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was fully litigated 
below, so that we will have the benefit of developed arguments on both 
sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.  See 
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552, n.3 (1990) (“Applying 
our analysis . . . to the facts of a particular case without the benefit of a 
full record or lower court determinations is not a sensible exercise of this 
Court’s discretion”).32 
A violation of the Court Rules does not necessarily mean that the 
constitutional requirement of a case or controversy has been violated.  
However, the rule itself indicates that the scope of the case before the 
Court should be limited to issues fairly presented by the parties, con-
sistent with the case or controversy requirement.  To the extent that 
the Court reaches out for different issues, not fairly included in the 
questions presented, it appears to be going beyond the judicial role 
set forth by the Constitution’s separation of powers.  And, as will be 
seen in the cases discussed below in Part II, each time the Court does 
so, it violates other prudential practices, and sometimes its own Court 
Rules.  The majority’s recent decision-making process and rationales 
contravene the way a court should act in a constitutional democracy 
with an adversary system. 
B.  Some Current Perspectives 
Views of the Court’s proper role have of course evolved over time, 
shaped and reshaped by various legal theories developed by propo-
nents of legal realism, the legal process school, critical legal studies, 
originalism, intentionalism, pragmatism, minimalism, principled mi-
nimalism, and other schools of thought.  Among these different ap-
proaches to understanding the Court, its role, and its obligations, one 
common thread is a concern for curbing judicial discretion.  While 
many commentators and some judges are deeply committed to one 
or the other of these various theories, there are increasing numbers 
of scholars and judges who do not believe any theory can limit a 
court’s discretion in judicial decision-making.  Dean Erwin Cheme-
 
 32 Yee, 503 U.S. at 538; see also Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028, 1029 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally undesirable to permit a party 
to seek reversal of a lower court’s judgment on a ground that the lower court had no op-
portunity to consider.  It is especially poor practice to do so when the basis for reversal in-
volves a factual issue on which neither party adduced any evidence.” (footnote omitted)); 
Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969) (“Questions not raised below are those 
on which the record is very likely to be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled 
with those questions in mind.”). 
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rinsky, for example, states that “[n]o theory can offer determinacy in 
constitutional decision-making or avoid the reality that results de-
pend on value choices made by judges in determining the meaning 
of the Constitution.”33  This Article suggests, however, that the struc-
ture of the Constitution should serve as a source for limiting the Su-
preme Court’s discretion in law-making. 
Like Dean Chemerinsky, Judge Richard Posner does not believe 
legal theories curb judicial discretion.34  But if they are right, and the 
much-discussed traditional legal theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion do not curb judicial discretion or limit judicial power, then what 
guidelines or standards can be looked to for evaluating judicial con-
duct?35  Among the many different perspectives on the scope and sub-
stance of proper judicial conduct, one that has provoked considera-
ble response is Posner’s book, How Judges Think.36  Judge Posner’s view 
of the role of judges and of the Supreme Court contrasts sharply with 
that of the Framers but in some ways does not appear to be too far 
out of step with certain perspectives of the current Supreme Court 
majority.  Posner asserts that the Supreme Court is a political court, 
particularly when it is deciding issues of constitutional law.37  From his 
perspective, the Court is necessarily political because it makes consti-
tutional decisions that are fundamentally political.38  Moreover, it fre-
quently must decide political issues for which there is no obvious an-
swer based on applicable legal doctrine.39  In this “open area,”40 where 
the law is unclear or underdeveloped, the Court must inevitably make 
the law and therefore function in a legislative manner.41  In addition, 
according to Posner, the fact that the Court now hears so few cases 
 
 33 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Interpretation for the Twenty-First Century, 1 ADVANCE:  J. 
ACS, ISSUE GROUPS 25, 26 (2007); see also POWELL, supra note 3, at 46 (“As a practical mat-
ter, the theory enterprise, to be blunt, hasn’t worked, in the sense that no one, not even 
Ely, has come even remotely close to persuading the politicians, judges, or lawyers—much 
less the American public—to adopt any particular theory [of the proper role of the judi-
ciary in exercising judicial review].  The theories all remain academic, in the most nega-
tive sense.”). 
 34 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 373 (2008).  Posner thinks such theories are 
shaped around controversial  ideologies and do not command a consensus among judges 
or academics.  See id. 
 35 Recent theories focus on moral philosophy and virtue jurisprudence.  See infra Part III. 
 36 See supra note 34. 
 37 See id. at 8, 269, 271. 
 38 See id. at 272.  Posner noted that constitutional issues “are political issues:  issues about po-
litical governance, political values, political rights and political power.”  Id. 
 39 See id. at 15. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id.  Posner views this open area as one where the Court has decisional discretion, and 
can write on a blank slate.  See id. at 9. 
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means that it is “out of the error correction business,”42 and that 
therefore it does not follow a conventional model of appellate re-
view.43  Rather, it has a basically legislative character.44 
Posner acknowledges that if a judge is merely “a politician in 
robes,”45 that raises the following question:  “[W]hat prevents the des-
cent of the judiciary into an abyss of unchanneled discretionary jus-
tice that would render law so uncertain and unpredictable that it 
would no longer be law but instead would be the exercise of raw po-
litical power by politicians called judges?”46  He thinks the answer is 
not that judges must undertake a commitment to a distinct legal 
theory, such as economics, originalism, moral theory, or Justice Brey-
er’s “active liberty.”47  Rather, he asserts that there is a “stabilizing 
force of consensus”—both a field-specific consensus in certain fields 
of law,48 and a social consensus.49  He acknowledges, however, that 
“the stabilizing force of consensus is weaker in the Supreme Court 
than in the lower courts, especially in constitutional cases.”50  In one 
discussion of constraints on federal courts of appeals and the Su-
preme Court, Posner pays lip service to the case or controversy re-
quirement, but does not in any way examine how in practice the re-
 
 42 Id. at 270. 
 43 See id.  In contrast, the lower courts decide most cases following a traditional formalist 
approach with only an occasional case that requires the court to make law in deciding 
cases. 
 44 See id. at 270 (“[T]he Court tries to use the few cases that it agrees to hear as occasions for 
laying down rules or standard that will control a large number of future cases.”). 
 45 Id. at 91. 
 46 Id. at 372. 
 47 Id.  For Justice Breyer’s view, see generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). 
 48 See POSNER, supra note 34, at 373.  For example, in contracts, commercial law, much of 
torts, property, bankruptcy, and antitrust law, and some intellectual property law, Posner 
posits the existence of a “limited, ideological consensus.”  Id. 
 49 See id.  Posner provides as an example of social consensus, “the current consensus of 
American elites, and much of the general public as well, in favor of free markets.”  Id.; cf. 
John E. Nowak, Realism, Nihilism and the Supreme Court:  Do the Emperors Have Nothing but 
Robes, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 246, 257 (1983) (“[J]ustices cannot base rulings on a societal 
consensus concerning specific fundamental rights and values since none exists.”).  “There 
is simply no evidence the Supreme Court has protected a set of values throughout its his-
tory which can be understood in terms of an identifiable system of moral philosophy or 
societal consensus.”  Id. at 262. 
 50 POSNER, supra note 34, at 374.  Posner also acknowledged in a chapter referring to “Ex-
ternal Constraints on Judging,” that constraints on Supreme Court Justices include 
precedent, Court-curbing legislation, the possibility of a constitutional amendment, nulli-
fication by Congress of statutory interpretations, possibility of harassment by budget 
committees of Congress, and the possibility of appointing new Justices with different 
views.  Id. at 150. 
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quirement works, or should work, or has not worked.51  Similarly, he 
mentions precedent as a constraint52 but later writes, “[A] sponge is 
not constraining, nor, in the Supreme Court, is precedent.”53 
Posner’s ultimate view of the proper role for the judge in making 
law is “constrained pragmatism,”54 by which he means that a judge 
should “assess[ ] the consequences of judicial decisions for their 
bearing on sound public policy as he conceives it.”55  The constrained 
pragmatist is Posner’s answer to the “legalist” judges, whom he de-
fines as judges who “apply[ ] preexisting rules . . . have no truck with 
policy, and do not look outside conventional legal texts . . . in decid-
ing new cases.”56 
Posner’s position as to the political nature of the Court and its leg-
islative character is provocative, and in some ways quite realistic, but 
certainly a far cry from the Framers’ vision that the legislative func-
tion should be completely separate from the judicial one.  His book 
has been criticized on a number of grounds, for example, for its ahis-
torical methodology,57 for overstating his case with respect to the in-
fluence of politics on judicial decisions,58 for poorly defining both le-
galism and pragmatism,59 and for providing no empirical support for 
 
 51 See id. at 156 (“[T]hey can decide only cases that someone chooses to file, because Article 
III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to cases or controver-
sies.”). 
 52 See id. at 150 (“[T]here are still constraints—from precedent . . . .”). 
 53 Id. at 275.  Posner also notes that the process of gradually extinguishing disliked prece-
dents is known as “boiling the frog.”  Id. at 277.  The Court extinguishes the precedent 
gradually, just as one would start to boil a frog with warm water that heats up slowly, kill-
ing the frog before he realizes he is in trouble and jumps out.  Id. 
 54 Id. at 13. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 8–9.  At other points in the book, Posner describes legalism more sympathetically, 
e.g., he writes:  “[M]any, indeed most, judicial decisions really are the product of a neu-
tral application of rules not made up for the occasion to facts fairly found.  Such deci-
sions exemplify what is commonly called ‘legal formalism,’ though the word I prefer is 
‘legalism.’”  Id. at 370. 
 57 See Craig Green, What Does Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
625, 642 n.82 (2010) (“My target in this Review is Posner’s extreme anti-historicism; thus, 
I have identified three areas where there exists at least some history of vital importance to 
law and legal study.”). 
 58 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 859, 862 (2010) (book review) (“To the extent he means to say that politics regularly 
make a difference in judicial decisions, he is wrong—and, as Dean Levi (formerly Judge 
Levi) suggests, he is engaging in “armchair empiricism.”). 
 59 See Chad Flanders, A Review of “How Judges Think” by Richard A. Posner, 3 L. & HUMAN. 118, 
120 (2009) (book review) (“If legalism is itself poorly defined in How Judges Think, can the 
same be said of pragmatism?  Sadly, the answer to this appears to be ‘yes.’”). 
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his conclusions.60  A particularly trenchant criticism was made by Da-
vid F. Levi, a former district court judge and Dean of Duke University 
School of Law: 
[O]ne detects not just Judge Posner’s well-known disdain for legal for-
malism, but something else more troubling and fundamental:  a resis-
tance to the limitations on a judge that are basic to our system, particular-
ly that judges sit to decide the issues actually presented within the confines of a 
particular case and record . . . [For Posner], such matters as precedent, the 
procedural posture of a case, the strategic decisions of the lawyers to ad-
vance certain positions and forgo others, and the actual facts in the 
record simply get in the way.61 
Although the criticism above is directed to Posner’s position, it 
could appropriately be applied as well to recent Supreme Court deci-
sions.  The Court has repeatedly resisted the fundamental limitation 
of deciding within the confines of a particular case and record, and 
has shown a lack of respect for precedent, for actual facts in the 
record, and for the decisions of lawyers to advance certain positions 
and forgo others.62  Instead, it has directed parties to refocus on issues 
the Court wanted to decide and has ignored actual facts in order to 
decide cases according to its policy preference.  Thus, while one can 
take issue with Posner’s methodology and focus, his approach, at least 
as to the issues raised by Dean Levi, may be consistent with that of a 
number of Justices of the Supreme Court. 
II.  REACHING OUT IN THE CASES 
Before considering other perspectives on the scope and substance 
of proper judicial conduct and possible limitations on judicial con-
duct, this Article will focus on four cases where the Supreme Court 
majority disregarded the confines of a particular case and record.  In 
these cases, the Court reached out to decide issues that were not in 
dispute between the litigants in order to overturn precedent it did 
not like.  As will be shown below, in one case, the issue the Court 
chose to decide had been abandoned below.  In another, the issue 
had been conceded below, and in none of the cases was the issue the 
Court decided based on a record in the lower courts.  The cases come 
from different areas of law:  Citizens United v. Federal  Elections Commis-
 
 60 See David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair (Reviewing Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think), 
58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1792–93 (2009) (“His generalizations about the ways of judge and the 
world are ex cathedra pronouncements that generally lack any identified objective sup-
port outside his own experience and belief.  For many of his assertions, it would appear 
his dataset of judges is a set of one—himself.”). 
 61 Id. at 1793–94 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 62 See infra Part II. 
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sion,63 a campaign finance case; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,64 a pleadings and Bi-
vens supervisory responsibility case; Montejo v. Louisiana,65 a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel case; and Gross v. FBL Financial Services,66 
an age discrimination case. 
A.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
Citizens United is the campaign finance case in which the Court de-
cided that corporations could spend unlimited amounts of money 
from their own treasuries to influence candidate elections in all ways 
except by direct contributions to the candidates themselves.67  Al-
though corporations could already make such expenditures through 
Political Action Committees, this was found by the Court to be too 
burdensome.68  The Court held that the limitations on using corpo-
rate treasury funds for express advocacy imposed by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA” or “McCain-Feingold”)69 
were unconstitutional because they violated a corporation’s free 
speech rights under the First Amendment.70 
The decision needs to be considered in the context of Congress’s 
efforts over the years to achieve some kind of balance of various in-
terests in the electoral process in order to maintain the confidence of 
citizens that they are part of a participatory democracy.  In Citizens 
United, the Court rejected the balance that Congress had tried to 
strike.71  The reasons the Court gave, and whether they are persuasive, 
 
 63 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 64 129 S. Ct 1937 (2009). 
 65 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
 66 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 67 130 S. Ct. at 876. 
 68 Id. at 897. 
 69 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 
U.S.C.).  The statute is also known by its popular name, McCain-Feingold. 
 70 130 S. Ct. at 898–99 (“Section 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent expenditures 
is thus a ban on speech.  As a ‘restriction on the amount of money a person or group can 
spend on political communication during a campaign,’ that statute ‘necessarily reduces 
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of 
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam))). 
 71 The decision was unpopular with the American public, 80% of whom opposed the ruling.  
Opposition was unusually bipartisan, and included 76% of Republicans polled and 73% 
of conservatives.  See Gary Langer, In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public 
Dissents, ABC NEWS BLOG (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/
thenumbers/2010/02/in-supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-finance-the-public-
dissents.html.  For other polls with similar, though not quite as strong results, see Richard 
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1644384. 
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as well as the policies advanced or overridden, have been dealt with 
by other scholars, and are not the focus of this Article.72  The focus 
here is whether the issues the Court decided were properly before it. 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court reached out to decide the 
facial constitutional validity of provisions of BCRA, a question not in 
dispute between the parties and not necessary to decide the case be-
fore it.  The only questions petitioner Citizens United had asked the 
Court to resolve73 were whether the particular provisions of BCRA 
 
 72 See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern Corporations, Corporate Go-
vernance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617 (2010); Hasen, supra 
note 71; Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm after Citizens United, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (2010); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 143 (2010); Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile:  Corruption and Abstraction in 
Citizens United, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 295 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, On Politi-
cal Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010); Michael Curtis Kent, Citizens United and 
Davis v. FEC:  Lochner on Steroids and Democracy on Life Support (Wake Forest Univ. Legal 
Studies, Working Paper Paper No. 1685459, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1685459 (discussing how the case “threatens to undermine the fiduciary duty of 
elected officials to the people”). 
 73 There were two sets of Questions Presented, one in the Jurisdictional Statement, and one 
in the appellant’s merits brief.  In the Jurisdictional Statement at i, Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), the Questions Presented were as follows: 
1.  Whether all as-applied challenges to the disclosure requirements (reporting 
and disclaimers) imposed on “electioneering communications” by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) were resolved by McConnell’s statement 
that it was upholding the disclosure requirements against facial challenge “‘for the 
entire range of electioneering communications’ set forth in the statute.”  Mem. 
Op. I, App. 15a (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003)). 
2.  Whether BCRA’s disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden 
when applied to electioneering communications protected from prohibition by 
the appeal-to-vote test, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 
(2007) (“WRTL II”), because such communications are protected “political 
speech,” not regulable “campaign speech,” id. at 2659, in that they are not “unam-
biguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate,” Buckley v. Va-
leo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976), or because the disclosure requirements fail strict scrut-
ny when so applied. 
3.  Whether WRTL II’s appeal-to-vote test requires a clear plea for action to vote 
for or against a candidate, so that a communication lacking such a clear plea for 
action is not subject to the electioneering communication prohibition.  2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b. 
4.  Whether a broadcast feature-length documentary movie that is sold on DVD, 
shown in theaters, and accompanied by a compendium book is to be treated as the 
broadcast “ads” at issue in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, or whether the movie is not 
subject to regulation as an electioneering communication. 
  In Brief for Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205), the 
Questions Presented were only two, both focused on an as-applied challenge: 
 1. Whether the prohibition on corporate electioneering communications in the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) can constitutionally be ap-
plied to a feature-length documentary film about a political candidate funded al-
most exclusively through noncorporate donations and made available to digital 
cable subscribers through Video On Demand.  
2.  Whether BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements can consti-
tutionally be applied to advertisements for that documentary film that the Federal 
Election Commission concedes are beyond its constitutional authority to prohibit. 
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were invalid as applied to video-on-demand showings of its documen-
tary movie about Hillary Clinton and to advertisements for the mov-
ie.74  If the Court had found the provisions invalid as applied, there 
would have been no need to declare the statute unconstitutional on 
its face or to overrule precedent.  Instead, however, the Court, after 
hearing oral argument, asked for supplemental briefing and argu-
ment, instructing the parties to address whether the Court should 
overrule two prior cases, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,75 and 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,76 which had upheld the issue 
of facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA.77 
1.  Background 
Citizens United is a non-profit, ideological organization that 
makes documentary films.78  During the 2008 primary season, it re-
leased a film entitled Hillary, the Movie.  The film, which was critical of 
Hillary Clinton, was distributed to a few theaters and was available on 
DVD.  Citizens United wanted the film to be more broadly available 
through video-on-demand, including availability during a period 
within thirty days of the 2008 presidential primary elections.79 
The problem was that federal law limited certain corporate-
funded independent expenditures.  The Federal Election Campaign 
Act (“FECA”) prohibited corporations not only from making direct 
contributions to candidates, but also from making independent ex-
penditures that expressly advocated for or against a candidate (for 
example, “issue ads” on TV).80  Until 2002, “express advocacy” had 
been interpreted as meaning that the restrictions essentially applied 
only if the language specifically said, “Vote for Jones,” or “Don’t vote 
for Jones.”81  Many issue ads and films had thus escaped the FECA re-
strictions by not urging such specific action.  However, in 2002, Con-
 
 74 The movie casts then-Senator Clinton in a very negative light.  According to the Court, 
“The movie, in essence, is a feature-length negative advertisement that urges viewers to 
vote against Senator Clinton for President.”  130 S. Ct. at 890. 
 75 494 U.S. 653 (1990). 
 76 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 77 Supreme Court Order List, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 2009,  
   http://www.Supremecourt.gov/orders/ordersofthecourt.aspx?Term=08. 
 78 Jurisdictional Statement at 6, Citizens United v. FEC at i, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-
205). 
 79 To promote the film, Citizens United also wanted to show three short ads with statements 
about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of the movie and the website address.  130 
S. Ct. at 887. 
 80 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000). 
 81 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.51 (1976) (per curiam). 
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gress closed that loophole when it enacted BCRA.  BCRA prohibited 
direct corporate funding of any “election communications.”82  Elec-
tion communications consisted of any television or radio communica-
tions pertaining to a candidate for federal election, if the election 
communications could reach 50,000 people in the relevant area thirty 
days before a primary election or sixty days before a general elec-
tion.83  There are also disclosure requirements for anyone spending 
over a certain amount.84  So under BCRA, corporations could not 
spend their funds for any election communication, although they 
could support such broadcasts with money from their Political Action 
Committees (“PACs”).85 
Citizens United brought a lawsuit based on First Amendment 
rights, seeking to enjoin the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) 
from enforcing certain provisions of BCRA.  Without the injunction, 
BCRA would prevent corporate funding of the distribution and ad-
vertisement of the movie, Hillary, during the thirty days before the 
Democratic National Committee Convention, and, if then Senator 
Clinton became the Democratic presidential nominee, within sixty 
days before the November general election.86 
A three-judge district court in D.C. unanimously rejected the ar-
guments of Citizens United, denying its request for a preliminary in-
junction.87  However, when Citizens United attempted to appeal the 
preliminary injunction decision, the Supreme Court dismissed for 
want of jurisdiction.88  Going back before the district court, the par-
ties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the court granted 
judgment to the FEC.89  This time, in response to Citizen United’s 
appeal, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.90 
 
 82 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, §§ 201, 203. 
 83 Id. at § 201. 
 84 Id.  The disclosure requirements were ultimately upheld by the Court.  Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. at 917. 
 85 Political Action Committees are separate organizations that a corporation is permitted to 
form in order to solicit funds for political activities.  However, under FECA there are limi-
tations on who could be solicited, and the amounts that could be contributed.  These li-
mitations were considered to be unduly burdensome by the Court.  Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 897–98.  Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that “Citizens United is a wealthy non-
profit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in 
assets.”  Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 86 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 87 With respect to a constitutional challenge, a section of BCRA provides for review by a 
three-judge district court.  BCRA § 403(a), 2 U.S.C 437(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2284. 
 88 Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2008).  BCRA also provides for direct appeal to 
the Supreme Court from the three-judge district court.  See id. 
 89 Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008) (mem.). 
 90 Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008) (mem.). 
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2.  Supreme Court Decision 
What did Citizens United want from the Supreme Court?  In both 
its jurisdictional statement and its merits brief, Citizens United asked 
the Court to decide whether BCRA was constitutional as applied to 
Citizens United’s specific situation.91  Originally, Citizens United had 
asserted a facial challenge—that is, that BCRA on its face violated the 
First Amendment—but that challenge had been rejected by the dis-
trict court in determining the motion for a preliminary injunction.92  
However, by the time the cross-motions for summary judgment were 
heard, the parties had stipulated to the withdrawal of Count 5 of Citi-
zens United’s complaint—the count dealing with a facial challenge.93  
Thus, before the district court heard the summary judgment motion, 
the facial challenge had been expressly abandoned and was no long-
er part of the case.94  As a result, the appeal that went to the Supreme 
Court was based on an as-applied case without a facial challenge to 
the constitutionality of BCRA.  Thus, a facial attack on BCRA was 
simply not a part of the final decision of the three-judge district court 
that was appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Because the facial challenge had been expressly abandoned be-
low, it is not surprising that Citizens United did not include any ref-
erence to a facial challenge in its jurisdictional statement to the Su-
preme Court.  Nor did it even mention in the jurisdictional statement 
the Austin or McConnell cases, much less ask that either case be over-
ruled. 
If the Supreme Court were acting as a court, it would have de-
cided the issues in Citizens United that had actually been presented 
within the confines of the particular case and record and would not 
have disregarded the strategic decisions of the lawyers to forgo the 
facial challenge.  By reinstating the abandoned claim, the Supreme 
Court failed to follow its own rules, which require a subsidiary ques-
tion to be fairly included in the question presented for review.95  
Here, the facial challenge had been expressly abandoned and was not 
 
 91 See supra note 73, questions presented by Citizens United in both the Jurisdictional 
Statement and in Brief for Appellant. 
 92 Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 281. 
 93 See Joint Appendix at 6a, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 186 (2010), (No. 08-205) 
(“Order dismissing Count 5 of the Amended Complaint pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties.  Signed by United State Circuit Judge A. Raymond Randolph, and United States 
District Judges Royce C. Lambeth and Richard W. Roberts, on May 23, 2008.”). 
 94 See Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008) (mem.). 
 95 See supra note 31 for pertinent text and discussion of Rule 14.1(a) of the Supreme Court 
Rules. 
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included in the Questions Presented, thereby leaving no basis for the 
Court to reach that issue.96 
Moreover, even if an argument could be made that the issue 
somehow remained in the case,97 the Court had previously stated, “It 
is only in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that 
questions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed.”98  The dis-
trict court, in its summary judgment decision—the final decision that 
was appealed to the Supreme Court—had no basis to consider a 
claim that had been expressly abandoned, so the issue was clearly not 
pressed or passed upon below.  If precedent had been followed, the 
only basis for the Court to consider a claim not pressed or passed on 
below was if the nature of the claim was exceptional.  Yet no sugges-
tion was made by either Citizens United or the Court that there was 
anything exceptional about this claim that would permit the Court to 
decide an issue not put before it by the parties. 
The fact that Citizens United briefly and belatedly asked in its me-
rits brief for Austin99 to be overruled does not change the fact that the 
issue of a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 203 was express-
ly abandoned below and not raised in the jurisdictional statement.  
Moreover, the brief reference to Austin was in the context of its ar-
gument that § 203 should not be applied to Citizens United because 
it received almost no corporate funding.100  Repeatedly, throughout 
its brief, Citizens United emphasized the “as-applied” nature of its 
challenge.101  The only time it mentioned a facial challenge was for 
the purpose of distinguishing the as-applied challenge in its case 
from the facial challenge that had been upheld in McConnell a few 
years earlier.102  An important argument to Citizens United was that 
the facial challenge to BCRA that had failed in McConnell did not fo-
 
 96 Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008) (mem.). 
 97 See infra notes 278–84 and accompanying text for arguments made by the Court. 
 98 Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 99 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 73, at 30–32. 
100 See id. at 32 (“The question here is whether Citizens United’s documentary is more like 
the speech in MCFL [FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life]—funded entirely by individuals—or 
the speech in Austin—funded by a membership that was ‘more than three-quarters” for-
profit corporations.”). 
101 See references to “as-applied” challenge in appellant’s merits brief in each of the two 
Questions Presented and on pages 2, 4 (three times), 10, 11, 12 (two times), 16 (three 
times), 18, 19, 21, 26 n.2, 28, 42 (five times), 43, 44, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57 (three times, in-
cluding note 5), for a total of thirty-two references.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 73. 
102 Id. at 4, 42. 
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reclose an as-applied challenge.  There was no suggestion by Citizens 
United that the Court should overrule McConnell.103 
Thus, the Court’s order directing the parties to file supplemental 
briefs addressing the question of whether the Court should overrule 
Austin and McConnell came as a surprise.104  Moreover, the surprise 
brought a certain unfairness.  Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that 
shortly before Citizens United agreed to abandon its facial challenge, 
the FEC had advised the district court that it required time to develop 
a factual record regarding the facial challenge.  No such record was 
developed because of the express withdrawal of the facial challenge.  
The record before the district court as well as before the Supreme 
Court was thus bereft of evidence relevant to the issue of the uncons-
titutionality of the statute.  By reinstating a claim that Citizens United 
had abandoned, the Court gave Citizens United “a perverse litigating 
advantage over its adversary, which was deprived of the opportunity 
to gather and present information necessary to its rebuttal.”105  More-
over, although the Court decided in favor of Citizens United on the 
grounds that the statute on its face chilled the free speech rights of 
corporations,106 there was, according to Justice Stevens, a “gaping em-
pirical hole” with respect to any evidence in support of this conclu-
sion107:  “Congress crafted BCRA in response to a virtual mountain of 
research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to 
avert.  The Court now negates Congress’ efforts without a shred of 
evidence on how § 203 or its state-law counterparts have been affect-
ing any entity other than Citizens United.”108 
In response to protests by the majority that the case could not 
possibly be decided on narrower grounds than finding BCRA § 203 
unconstitutional on its face, Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent 
that the parties “advanced numerous ways to resolve the 
case . . . without toppling statutes and precedents.”109  Instead, howev-
 
103 See id. 
104 See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at 
A1 (“When the case was first argued last March, it seemed a curiosity likely to be decided 
on narrow grounds.  The court could have ruled that Citizens United was not the sort of 
group to which the McCain-Feingold law [BCRA] was meant to apply, or that the law did 
not mean to address 90-minute documentaries, or that video-on-demand technologies 
were not regulated by the law . . . . Instead, it addressed the questions it proposed to the 
parties in June when it set down the case for an unusual second argument in September, 
those of whether Austin and McConnell should be overruled.”). 
105 130 S. Ct. 876 at 933 n.4 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
106 See id. at 913. 
107 Id. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 936–37. 
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er, the Court gutted Congress’s campaign finance laws, despite hav-
ing affirmed the facial constitutionality of § 203 only six years before 
in McConnell.  The difference from six years before can only be un-
derstood by the change in the personnel of the Supreme Court.110  
The Court’s failure to respect the most important principles of judi-
cial process, such as stare decisis, the avoidance canon (only deciding 
constitutional issues when  necessary), and the case or controversy 
requirement (only deciding issues presented within the confines of a 
particular case and record), demonstrate that this judicial body did 
not conduct itself as a court.  Had it acted as a court, it would have 
decided the question Citizens United presented:  Whether certain 
BCRA provisions, as applied to Citizens United, were unconstitution-
al.  A true court would have awaited the next case, for a party that 
presented a facial challenge to BCRA, and for a record developed in 
the lower court on that question, before deciding whether corporate 
speech had been chilled by the BCRA provisions.  If the Court had 
concluded that the question of the facial unconstitutionality of BCRA 
was antecedent to the question presented, an appropriate judicial re-
sponse would be to send the case back to the lower courts to allow the 
parties to litigate that question, including the development of a full 
record on the issue.111 
B.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
In Citizens United, the Court reached out and decided an issue that 
was not before it because it had been abandoned below.  Similarly, in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reached out for an issue that had been 
conceded below and that was not in dispute between the parties.  
Nonetheless, the Court decided the previously conceded issue with-
out having the benefit of briefing or argument, much less a record.112  
The petitioners, John Ashcroft, former Attorney General, and Robert 
Mueller, the Director of the FBI (hereinafter, “Ashcroft” or “the peti-
tioners”) had conceded that they could be liable to Iqbal if they had 
 
110 Chief Justice Rehnquist died and was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice 
O’Connor retired and was replaced by Justice Alito. 
111 Deciding that the facial constitutionality of a statute must be determined prior to an as-
applied challenge is completely at odds with longstanding judicial practice.  The avoid-
ance canon supports not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily.  See Adrian 
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1945 (1997) (“[A] central tenet[] of 
federal statutory construction . . . is the canon of avoidance, which in its modern form di-
rects courts to avoid substantial constitutional questions.”).  In accordance with this ca-
non, an as-applied challenge should be resolved without determining facial constitutio-
nality, particular when no facial constitutional challenge has been asserted by the parties. 
112 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954–55 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by subordinates and 
exhibited deliberate indifference to it.113  Their concession was not 
surprising, given that this was the existing standard for liability under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,114 which had been made 
clear in decisions of the Supreme Court and of the circuit courts.115  
The Court, however, changed the law by sua sponte eliminating su-
pervisory liability of any kind under Bivens.116 
1.  Background 
Iqbal was a Muslim citizen of Pakistan arrested in the United 
States after the attacks of September 11, 2001.117  He was one of 184 
detainees listed as persons of “high interest” to the September 11th 
investigation and held in a maximum security facility under restrictive 
conditions.118  He brought suit for damages based on constitutional 
violations while in federal custody, including being kicked, punched 
and otherwise mistreated.119  He also alleged that the federal officials 
Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted an unconstitutional policy as to 
his confinement and treatment, and that they “‘knew of, condoned, 
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ respondent to harsh 
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his] religion, race and/or national origin and for no legitimate pe-
nological interest.’”120  The district court denied Ashcroft’s motion to 
dismiss Iqbal’s complaint for insufficiency to show unconstitutional 
conduct by Ashcroft and Mueller, and the Second Circuit affirmed.121  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.122 
 
113 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27–28, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 
07-1015), 2008 WL 336225; Brief for Petitioners at 50, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4063957. 
114 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
115 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 
262 (2d Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Martin 195 F.3d 1208, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 1999); Boyd v. 
Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); 
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994); Manarite v. Springfield, 
957 F.2d 953, 957 (1st Cir. 1992); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479-80 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
116 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
117 See id. at 1942 (majority opinion). 
118 Id. at 1943. 
119 Id. at 1942, 1944. 
120 Id. at 1944. 
121 Id. at 1942–43. 
122 Id. at 1954. 
184 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
2.  Supreme Court Decision 
Although most of the focus on Iqbal has been on the new pleading 
standard created by the Court,123 the decision made another major 
change in the law.  The Court eliminated supervisory liability under 
Bivens.  Bivens established that there could be suits for damages 
against federal officials for violations of certain constitutional 
rights.124  It is well-established in case law that under Bivens there can 
be no liability of a supervising official on a theory of respondeat supe-
rior.125  Rather, there must be culpable conduct directly attributable 
to the supervisor.  At the very least, according to Supreme Court 
precedent prior to Iqbal, liability will not attach unless the supervisor 
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk” of harm.126  In other 
words, the supervisor can be liable under Bivens if he is deliberately 
 
123 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court substantially changed existing pleading rules.  See, e.g., Ro-
bert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:  A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 850 (2010); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 53 (2010).  A prior decision by the Court, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, had 
earlier modified the traditional notice pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 8(a)(2) by holding that pleadings should not just give notice, but should function 
to screen for meritless suits.  550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).  Twombly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) 
as requiring a statement of claim that was plausible, not just possible.  Id. at 555–56.  In 
Iqbal, however, the Court went further by developing a two pronged analysis of pleading 
sufficiency. 129 S. Ct. at 1950.  First, the Court separated out allegations it considered to 
be legal conclusions, which it said could not be accepted as true because they were con-
clusory.  Second, looking only at the factual allegations, the Court found them to be in-
sufficient.  Id. at 1951.  Justice Souter, who wrote the Twombly decision, was quite critical 
of the Court’s new approach in Iqbal because it found allegations conclusory by looking at 
them in isolation, and did not consider the complaint as a whole.  129 S. Ct. at 1960–61 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  The Court’s decision as to the pleading rules has been quite con-
troversial and widely discussed by commentators.  See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming 
Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); Adam Steinman, The Pleading 
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Martin H. Redish & Lee Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly and the Future of Pleading in the Federal Courts:  A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 
(Northwestern Public Law Research, Working Paper No. 10–13), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581481. 
124 Its counterpart against state officials is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In Iqbal, violations of the First 
and Fifth Amendments were alleged.  See generally James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, 
Rethinking Bivens:  Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L. J. 117 (2009). 
125 See, e.g., Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 678–79 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In a Bivens action,  
there is no respondeat superior liability.”); Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in Bivens actions.”); Dalrym-
ple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable un-
der [Bivens] for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat 
superior or vicarious liability.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).  
Respondeat superior is the doctrine under which “[a]n employer is subject to liability for 
torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
126 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
Oct. 2011] BEYOND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 185 
 
indifferent to the harm from constitutional violations being caused by 
individuals under his supervision.127 
In attempting to obtain dismissal of Iqbal’s case, Ashcroft focused 
on two arguments, both raised in the two Questions Presented in the 
Petition for Certiorari.128  First, he argued that the pleadings were in-
sufficient because they contained only conclusory allegations that 
high-level government officials had knowledge of alleged wrongdoing 
of their subordinates.129  Second, he argued that high-level officials 
who did not have actual knowledge could not be held liable on a 
theory of constructive knowledge.130  He conceded, both in the Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari and in the Merits Brief, that if the petition-
ers had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of wrongdoing, and 
were deliberately indifferent, they would be liable.131  This concession 
was based on the law as declared by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. 
Brennan,132 and as consistently expressed by circuit courts.  Neither 
party challenged the applicability of that standard of liability to the 
conduct at issue in the Iqbal case.  Ashcroft’s aim throughout the brief 
was to distinguish the actual knowledge standard from a constructive 
knowledge standard.  He argued that although some circuit courts, 
including the Second Circuit, appeared to accept a constructive 
knowledge standard,133 in fact, any standard other than actual know-
ledge should preclude liability.134 
Iqbal conceded that he could not recover under a theory of res-
pondeat superior, and never claimed Ashcroft was liable under a con-
structive notice theory.135  So the parties appeared to agree that liabili-
 
127 See id. at 841. 
128 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 113, at i.  The two Questions Presented were 
as follows: 
 1.  Whether a conclusory allegation that a Cabinet-level officer or other high-
ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly 
unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient 
to state individual-capacity claims against those official under Bivens. 
 2.  Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held per-
sonally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the 
ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrim-
ination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials. 
129 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 113, at 15-42. 
130 See id. at 42–52. 
131 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 113, at 14, 27 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
841–42); Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 113, at 50. 
132 See supra note 126. 
133 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 113, at 26–28. 
134 See id. at 29 (“As applied to the allegations in this case, the standard articulated in Farmer 
for ‘deliberate indifference,’ would preclude liability unless petitioners had actual know-
ledge of the discriminatory selection of suspects as ‘of high interest . . . .’”). 
135 See 129 S. Ct. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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ty turned on petitioners’ actual knowledge and deliberate indiffe-
rence, and on whether Iqbal had properly pleaded under Rule 
8(a)(2).136  Despite the parties’ apparent agreement as to the actual 
knowledge standard, and despite neither party having requested the 
Court to revisit that standard, the Court, without requesting addi-
tional briefs or argument, sua sponte eliminated actual knowledge as 
a basis for liability under Bivens, as well as any other standard that 
would be based on supervisory responsibility.137 
In order to abolish any concept of liability based on supervisory 
responsibility under Bivens, the Supreme Court equated the supervi-
sory responsibility standard with respondeat superior, and then as-
serted that a supervisor is never liable for the acts of subordinates, but 
only “for his or her own misconduct.”138  This was a new statement of 
the law, which was contrary to established precedent, both at the Su-
preme Court level and in circuit decisions.139  Supervisory liability, as 
the dissent pointed out, is not like respondeat superior, where liabili-
ty for the principal or the employer is based solely on acts of subordi-
nates because they are within the scope of employment or responsi-
bility.140  Rather, with supervisory responsibility, there is a spectrum of 
fault by a supervisor that could lead to liability.141  It could be actual 
knowledge coupled with deliberate indifference, as the Supreme 
Court had found in Farmer.142  Liability could attach, as Chief Justice 
Roberts stated when he was on the D.C. Circuit, where supervisors 
“know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or 
turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.”143  Liability has also 
been imposed on a supervisor who was reckless or grossly negligent in 
supervising.144 
So the Supreme Court changed the law in a fundamental way, in 
disregard of precedent, and did so even though the issue had not 
been put before it by the parties.  It determined sua sponte a matter 
 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 1949. 
138 Id. (majority opinion). 
139 See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
140 See 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The dichotomy is false.  Even if an employ-
er is not liable for the actions of his employee solely because the employee was acting 
within the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to render a supervisor li-
able for the conduct of his subordinate.”) 
141 See id. (“[T]here is quite a spectrum of possible tests for supervisory liability . . . .”). 
142 511 U.S. 825, 837, 841 (1994). 
143 Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Chica-
go, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)). 
144 See, e.g., Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto 
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 911, 914 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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that was conceded below, that was not in controversy between the 
parties, and that the parties had not asked the Court to decide.  The 
new law that the Court created was unsupported by a factual record 
below and had not been briefed or argued by the parties.  There were 
no lower court opinions which the Court could consider in reaching 
its decision.  The decision represents a flagrant departure from the 
Court’s traditional prudential practices, and raises serious concerns 
about how it manages its certiorari jurisdiction. 
The dissent pointed out the unfairness of the Court’s deciding a 
question that had been neither briefed nor argued.145  As a result of 
the petitioners’ concession below that supervisory liability could be 
based on actual knowledge and deliberate indifference to risk of 
harm, Iqbal could not have foreseen the need to argue the point, and 
thus had no chance to be heard on the question.146  Moreover, the 
dissent suggested that had the issue been briefed and argued, a rea-
sonable middle ground between respondeat superior and no supervi-
sory responsibility at all could have been found, particularly in light 
of the consensus of the circuits.147  The dissent stated further that the 
Court’s elimination of supervisory responsibility as a basis for liability 
was not necessary to the Court’s decision, but if it were necessary, 
then that would make the decision even more unfair.148  If the stan-
dard for supervisory liability were a dispositive issue, then it was even 
more inappropriate for Iqbal to be given no opportunity to brief and 
argue the point.149 
That the Court made it even more difficult to establish liability 
under Bivens is not surprising in light of a rather long line of deci-
sions over the last quarter century that have increasingly limited Bi-
vens’ s liability.150  But what is surprising and disturbing is the Su-
 
145 129 S. Ct. at 1957–58 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
146 See id. at 1957 (“[T]he Court’s approach is most unfair to Iqbal.  He was entitled to rely 
on Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession . . . that they could be held liable on a theory of 
knowledge and deliberate indifference.  By overriding that concession, the Court denies 
Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.”). 
147 See id. at 1958. 
148 See id. (“What is most remarkable about [the Court’s] foray into supervisory liability is that 
its conclusion has no bearing on its resolution of the case.”). 
149 See id. at 1958 n.2 (“[T]he majority’s rejection of the concession is somehow outcome 
determinative . . . for Iqbal had no reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervi-
sory liability standard in light of the concession.”). 
150 See Alexander A Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the 
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, National 
Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255, 259 (2010) (“[T]he unbro-
ken pattern of the Court’s decision since the early 1980’s has been to limit Bivens dramat-
ically, even in cases where no other obvious legal remedy seemed available.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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preme Court did not act like a court in doing so.  Even commentators 
who agreed with the Supreme Court’s result of eliminating supervi-
sory liability were “surprised” and “troubled” that the Court did so 
without briefing or argument.151  A Court conducting itself properly 
would not have ignored the concession below and would not have 
decided an issue unnecessary to resolve the matter before it.  At the 
very least, if the issue was necessary to resolve the matter before the 
Court (which did not appear to be the case), the Court should have 
remanded the question to permit it to be considered below, and then 
would have had the benefit of a record below on the issue, lower 
court decisions, as well as briefs and arguments, when it came before 
the Court.  By not acting properly as a court, the conservative majori-
ty shortchanged the parties and the judicial process. 
C.  Montejo v. Louisiana 
In Montejo, the issue involved the scope of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Just as it had done in Citizens United, the Court 
reached out beyond the questions presented to overrule a case—in 
this instance, Michigan v. Jackson.152  In so doing, the Court disre-
garded stare decisis and acted “on its own initiative and without any 
evidence that the longstanding Sixth Amendment protections estab-
lished in Jackson [had] caused any harm to the workings of the crimi-
nal justice system.”153 
1.  Background 
During a preliminary hearing, a Louisiana court ordered counsel 
to be appointed for Jesse Jay Montejo, who was charged with first de-
gree murder.154  Montejo said nothing at the hearing to indicate that 
he accepted the appointment; nor was he asked if he accepted the 
appointment.155  Later, after he was read his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona,156 but before any contact with counsel, he was questioned by 
police and asked if he would accompany them to hunt for the mur-
 
151 See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Overdeterrence and Supervisory Liability After 
Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 280, 292–93 (2010) (“[I]t is surprising from a process 
perspective that the Court announced that it was adopting the [new] approach to super-
visory liability under circumstances of no briefing and no argument. This is particularly 
troubling because the circuits for the most part adopted the [prior] approach.”). 
152 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
153 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2094 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
154 See id. at 2082 (majority opinion). 
155 See id. at 2083. 
156 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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der weapon.157  During the trip, at the suggestion of the police, he 
wrote a letter of apology to the widow of the murdered man, apolo-
gizing for the murder.158  Despite defense objection at trial, the letter 
was admitted into evidence, and Montejo was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.159 
The rule of Jackson was that “if the police initiate interrogation af-
ter a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, 
of his right to counsel, any waiver of defendant’s right to counsel for 
that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”160  Thus, it would appear 
that under Jackson, any waiver by Montejo of his right to have counsel 
present with respect to any police-initiated questioning was invalid.  
Jackson made clear that a defendant cannot be subject to questioning 
outside the presence of counsel unless he initiates “exchanges or 
conversations with the police.”161  However, in affirming Montejo’s 
conviction and sentence, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 
rule of Jackson was not triggered unless the defendant actually re-
quested a lawyer or in some way asserted his right to counsel.162  Be-
cause Montejo had said nothing at the time the court ordered coun-
sel to be appointed, the court found he had not triggered the rule.163  
According to the court, the waiver of his right not to be questioned 
unless his lawyer was present was thus not automatically invalid.164  
Nonetheless, the question remained whether the waiver was made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.165  The Louisiana court then 
held that the waiver was properly made because the police had read 
Montejo his Miranda rights, which sufficiently informed him of his 
right to counsel and of the consequences of proceeding without 
counsel.166 
2.  Supreme Court Decision 
Montejo asked the Court to reverse on the ground that the Loui-
siana rule was inconsistent with Jackson.  Respondent Louisiana 
sought affirmance, claiming the decision was consistent with Jackson.  
 
157 See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 
161 See id. at 626. 
162 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260–61 & 1261 n.68 (La. 2008). 
163 See id. at 1261. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 1262. 
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Both parties sought clarification of a defendant’s rights after counsel 
has been appointed.167  The Supreme Court criticized the Louisiana 
court’s application of the Jackson rule as “exceedingly hazy” because it 
treated differently defendants who requested counsel and defendants 
for whom counsel was appointed without a request.168  The Court also 
noted that states followed different practices with respect to ap-
pointment of counsel, some requiring that a formal request be made 
and others appointing counsel automatically upon a finding of indi-
gency.169  Had the Court decided the case before it, it would have 
simply reversed the Louisiana court for improperly interpreting Jack-
son.  It then could have declared a bright-line, easy-to-follow rule that 
whenever defendants requested counsel or when counsel was ap-
pointed without a request, then any alleged waiver by defendant of 
his right to counsel with respect to a police-initiated interrogation 
would be invalid.  Instead, the Court reached out beyond the case for 
a resolution neither party had sought.  It asked for supplementary 
briefs on whether Jackson should be overruled and then proceeded to 
overrule this 23-year-old case.170 
As justification for running roughshod over the doctrine of stare 
decisis, the Court offered several arguments.  First, it asserted that the 
Jackson decision had proved unworkable.171  Second, it claimed that 
the Jackson rule had only marginal benefits that were outweighed by 
substantial costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal justice 
system.172  Third, it declared that because the Jackson opinion was only 
two decades old, “eliminating it would not upset expectations.”173  Fi-
nally, the Court described the purpose of the Jackson rule narrowly, as 
simply protecting against police badgering, and found that this right 
 
167 The question presented on behalf of petitioner Montejo was as follows:  “When an indi-
gent defendant’s right to counsel has attached and counsel has been appointed, must the 
defendant take additional affirmative steps to ‘accept’ the appointment in order to secure 
the protections of the Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation 
without counsel present?”  Brief for the Petitioner at i, Montejo v. Lousiana, 129 S. Ct. 
2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2008 WL 4948399.  In its initial brief, appellee-respondent 
Louisiana presented the following question:  “Does the rule established by the Court in 
Michigan v. Jackson bar police interrogation when a defendant has not requested counsel 
or otherwise asserted his right to counsel and has validly waived his right to counsel, but a 
court has appointed the Indigent Defender Board to represent him?”  Id. (citation omit-
ted). 
168 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2084 (2009). 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 2091. 
171 See id. at 2088. 
172 See id. at 2091. 
173 See id. at 2089. 
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was already sufficiently protected by the rules of prior cases174—
Miranda,175 Edwards v. Arizona,176 and Minnick v. Mississippi.177 
Remarkably, in support of its first three arguments, the Court of-
fered no evidence whatsoever.178  Since the workability of the Jackson 
rule had not been raised below, there was no record bearing on this 
point.  If the rule of Jackson as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court was unworkable, that called for reversal of the Louisiana 
court’s decision, but not doing away with the Jackson rule.  Evidence 
that the rule worked just fine, that it did not pose major costs to the 
criminal justice system, and that overruling Jackson would indeed up-
set expectations, was put forth cogently and persuasively in an amicus 
brief filed on behalf of “numerous former federal and state law en-
forcement officers, prosecutors, and judges who believe that Michigan 
v. Jackson provides bright-line guidance for post-arraignment custodi-
al interrogations, that the decision promotes fair, effective law en-
forcement, and that overturning it would sow confusion and under-
mine our criminal justice system.”179 
The views of these law enforcement officers, prosecutors and 
judges were apparently not at all persuasive to the Court, who simply 
declared by judicial fiat that Jackson was overruled.180 
 
174 See id. at 2090. 
175 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); see also Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (“[A]ny suspect subject to 
custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be 
advised of that right.”). 
176 452 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); see also Montejo, 129 U.S. at 2089–90 (“Once a defendant] has 
invoked his right to have counsel present, interrogation must stop.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
177 498 U.S. 146 (1990); see Montejo, 129 U.S. at 2090 (“[Once defendant has invoked right to 
counsel] no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present, whether or 
not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
178 The dissent noted that the majority did not cite “any empirical or even anecdotal sup-
port.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2097 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
179 See generally Amicus Brief of Larry D. Thompson, former Deputy Attorney General of the 
United State, and former United States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia, et al., 
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 1007118. 
180 An opposing view was presented in another amicus brief filed by a number of states in 
support of respondent.  That brief argued that the Jackson rule was unworkable.  Howev-
er, no specific evidence was presented to support that claim.  Rather, the assertion was 
that the Montejo case demonstrated unworkability because “[u]nder [the Louisiana] rule, 
appointment is automatic and requires no request by the defendant.  Other states employ 
different procedures, some requiring a request, others making appointment automatic.”  
Supplemental Brief for the States of New Mexico, Alabama, et al., at *17, Montejo v. Lou-
siana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2008 WL 1007122.  Amici further argued that 
these different procedures would result in different assumptions as to defendant’s inten-
tions, making the rule unworkable.  See id. at *17–18.  Of course, this “unworkability” 
could be made workable simply by announcing a bright line rule, as Montejo requested—
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The fourth and final reason the Court gave—that the Jackson rule 
was superfluous because individuals were already protected against 
police badgering under the Fifth Amendment181—is highly contesta-
ble in light of the core purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  As stated 
in a recent Leading Cases note in the Harvard Law Review concern-
ing Montejo, 
[J]ust as the Fifth Amendment’s key concern—the coercive pressures of 
custody—merits a rule protecting voluntariness in the Fifth Amendment 
context, the Sixth Amendment’s key concerns—the coercive pressures 
and legal complexities of criminal adjudication—merit a rule protecting 
voluntariness and knowingness in the Sixth Amendment context.  The 
Court should not be less attuned to the objects of concern under the 
Sixth Amendment than those under the Fifth Amendment, especially 
when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is in the text of the Consti-
tution. 182 
Once adversarial proceedings begin between a defendant and the 
State, the Sixth Amendment should ensure that the defendant can 
rely upon counsel as a medium between himself and the power of the 
State.183  A defendant is entitled to have counsel present in critical 
confrontations with the State, because these pre-trial proceedings 
“might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a 
mere formality.”184  An uncounseled defendant will frequently have 
no idea of the consequences of statements he makes to the police.  
Miranda warnings do not spell this out.185  As the dissent noted, warn-
ings designed purely to safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination are not adequate to protect Montejo’s “more ro-
bust Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”186 
One may or may not agree with the Supreme Court majority’s 
view that the Sixth Amendment is adequately protected by warnings 
related to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  In 
either case, however, it is troubling that the Court was so quick to 
overturn Jackson when the issue that the parties asked it to resolve did 
not require that Jackson be overruled, and the question of whether 
Jackson should be overruled did not appear to be fairly included in 
 
that once counsel was appointed, whether requested by the defendant or not—there 
should be no police-initiated interrogations without counsel present. 
181 See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090. 
182 The Supreme Court, 2008 Term:  Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 182, 192 (2009). 
183 See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
184 See id. at 2099 (citations omitted). 
185 Miranda warnings do not make clear “the assistance a lawyer can render during post-
indictment interrogation.”  Id. at 2100. 
186 See id. 
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the questions presented.187  In reaching out beyond the case before it 
in order to change the law, the Court did not act like a court, but ra-
ther like a super-legislature—except that unlike a legislature, it did 
not hold hearings, gather data, listen to testimony, or take any steps 
to be well informed about the new law it was creating.188  The Court 
simply chose to make new law according to its own hunches and poli-
cy preferences with respect to law enforcement, without the devel-
opment of a record below on the actual workability of the rule.189  It 
also ignored the contrary views of many participants in the field of 
criminal justice, such as those expressed in the Thompson amicus 
brief.190  Overruling Jackson was not part of the case the parties put be-
fore the Court and was not necessary to decide the case.  Rather, the 
majority disregarded important prudential practices, such as deciding 
a case within the confines of a well developed record, in order to im-
pose its particular preference for cutting back defendants’ funda-
mental rights under the Sixth Amendment.  By reaching beyond the 
case put before it, the Court did not act like the “least dangerous 
branch” of the government.191  Rather, the majority’s action could be 
considered dangerous to our representative democracy because it 
overstepped its boundaries as a court and acted without benefit of a 
record developed in the courts below in order to create sua sponte 
new law undervaluing and undermining a defendant’s fundamental 
right to counsel.192 
 
187 See questions presented, supra note 167. 
188 See, e.g., Neil Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 323, 327 (2005) (“Unlike legislators, who can investigate and evaluate . . . by hold-
ing hearings, taking polls, studying their mail, and visiting constituents—judges are con-
fined to “the record . . . .”).  When the Court has no record on which to base its decision, 
then it cannot act as a court. 
189 “[T]he rule announced in Jackson protects a fundamental right that the Court now dis-
honors.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
190 See Amicus Brief of Larry D. Thompson, supra note 179. 
191 See Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028, 1031 (1982) (“[N]either Article III of the Constitution 
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this Court with any roving author-
ity to decide federal questions that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation.”) 
192 As the dissent noted, “[s]uch a decision can only diminish the public’s confidence in the 
reliability and fairness of our system of justice.”  Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2099 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  “[T]he dubious benefits [the Court] hopes to achieve are far outweighed by 
the damage it does to the rule of law and the integrity of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.”  Id. at 2101. 
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D.  Gross v. FBL Financial Services 
In Gross yet again, in order to make new law, the Court decided a 
question not put before it by the parties.193  The question actually pre-
sented was “whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age 
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in 
a suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (“ADEA”).”194  Instead of deciding this question, however, the 
Court reached out to change the standard for proving discrimination 
in non-Title VII cases.  It rejected the standard adopted twenty years 
earlier in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that if a discriminatory reason 
was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, the burden of 
proof would shift to the employer to prove it would have made the 
same decision absent discrimination.195  Instead, it declared that be-
cause Price Waterhouse was a Title VII case,196 it did not apply to age 
discrimination cases, and that for age discrimination, an employee 
must always prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged 
employer decision.197  Proving a “but-for” cause means the plaintiff 
must show that if he was not the age he was, the employer would not 
have treated him in the adverse manner that it did.  Instead of prov-
ing that discrimination was “a motivating factor” in the employment 
decision, the plaintiff in an age discrimination case now must prove 
discrimination is “the determinative factor.”  By changing this stan-
dard, the Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove an age 
discrimination case. 
 
193 The dissent stated that by resurrecting the “but-for” standard, which had been rejected 
twenty years earlier in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Court was en-
gaging in “an unabashed display of judicial lawmaking.”  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. 
Ct. 2343, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
194 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing the ADEA, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621–34 (2006)). 
195 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 244–47. 
196 Until Gross, ADEA standards were generally understood to conform to Title VII standards, 
because of the similarity of purpose in the two statutes, and the almost identical language. 
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[The] interpreta-
tion of Title VII . . . applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA ‘were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’”  (quoting 
Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (citations omitted)); see also McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (“The ADEA and Title VII share 
common substantive features and also a common purpose . . . .”). 
197 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349, 2351. 
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1.  Background 
Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial in 1971.198  In 2003, at 
age fifty-four, he was moved from a position as claims administration 
director to claims project coordinator, and many of his former re-
sponsibilities were reassigned to a woman in her early forties whom 
he had previously supervised.199  Gross considered his new position a 
demotion based on his age, and brought an age discrimination suit.  
The jury decided in his favor, but the Eighth Circuit reversed and 
remanded.200  At issue were the jury instructions.  The district court 
had instructed the jury to return a verdict for Gross if he proved that 
his “age was a motivating factor” and that “age would qualify as ‘a mo-
tivating factor’ if [it] played a part or a role in [FBL]’s decision to 
demote [him].”201  The district court also told the jury that it must de-
cide in favor of FBL if FBL proved that it would have demoted Gross 
anyway for reasons other than age.202 
This kind of instruction is known as a mixed-motives instruction, 
and, under Price Waterhouse, it was permitted when an employee had 
suffered an adverse employment action because of both discriminato-
ry and non-discriminatory reasons.203  The plurality in Price Waterhouse 
held that once an employee showed that age was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment action, then the burden of persuasion 
shifted to the employer to prove it would have made the same deci-
sion anyway.  Absent such proof by the employer, the employee 
would prevail.204  However, because Price Waterhouse was a plurality de-
cision with two concurrences—one by Justice White and one by Jus-
tice O’Connor—the rule of the case was not clear as to what kind of 
evidence was needed to obtain a mixed-motive instruction that would 
shift the burden to the employer.  According to Justice White, the 
discriminatory factor had to be “substantial.”205  According to Justice 
O’Connor, there had to be “direct evidence” before the mixed-
motive instruction could be given.206  Many lower courts tended to as-
sume Justice O’Connor’s view was controlling, but there was substan-
 
198 See id. at 2346. 
199 See id. at 2346–47. 
200 See id. at 2347. 
201 Id. 
202 See id. 
203 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 244–47. 
204 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354. 
205 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (White, J., concurring). 
206 See id. at 275 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
196 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
tial confusion over what “direct evidence” was.207  Gross argued, based 
on the Court’s decision in Marks v. United States,208 that Justice White’s 
concurrence was controlling rather than Justice O’Connor’s because 
his concurrence was based on a narrower ground.  Justice White be-
lieved that direct evidence was not required, but rather that discrimi-
nation had to be shown to be a substantial factor.209  Gross also argued 
that for Justice White, there was no difference between “a substantial 
factor” and “a motivating factor.”210 
Congress had codified and to some extent modified the Price Wa-
terhouse rule in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, clarifying that “a motivat-
ing factor” would shift the burden; no mention was made of a heigh-
tened standard of evidence, such as “direct evidence.”211  However, 
the Eighth Circuit in Gross concluded that this new section, which 
amended Title VII, did not make a corresponding change in the 
ADEA.212  It thus held that Price Waterhouse continued to govern ADEA 
cases and that Justice O’Connor’s view requiring direct evidence was 
controlling.213  Consequently, because no direct evidence214 of discrim-
ination had been presented by Gross, the district court’s mixed mo-
tive instruction to the jury was improper.215  According to the circuit 
court, the burden of persuasion should never have shifted to the em-
ployer.  Gross should have been required to prove that age was more 
than a motivating factor.  He needed to meet the more difficult stan-
 
207 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
208 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“[When] no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because Justice White believed that the 
mixed motive instruction could be given when discrimination was a substantial factor, but 
did not think direct evidence was required, arguably his concurrence made the fifth vote 
rather than Justice O’Connor’s. 
209 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259. 
210 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, at *5 n.3, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) 
(No. 08-441), 2009 WL 740767 (“Justice White’s concurring opinion cannot be read as 
treating ‘substantial factor’ as different (or more stringent than) ‘a motivating factor’; he 
regarded the two phrases as synonymous.  [Price Waterhouse,] 490 U.S. at 259 (‘substantial 
factor’—or to put it in other words . . . a ‘motivating factor’) . . . .” (quoting Mt. Healthy 
City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977))). 
211 See § 107 of the 1991 Act, amending Title VII by adding § 2000e-2(m). 
212 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2007). 
213 See id. at 362, 359. 
214 The Eighth Circuit defined “direct evidence” as evidence “showing a specific link between 
the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a 
finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the ad-
verse employment action.”  Id. at 359 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
215 See id. 
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dard that “age was the determining factor,” or “the but-for” factor in 
the employment action.216  Holding that Gross had not presented the 
direct evidence that the court considered critical for a mixed-motive 
instruction and that he had not met the higher but-for standard, the 
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.217 
2.  Supreme Court Decision 
The question that was presented to the Supreme Court was quite 
clear.  The parties asked the Court to decide if direct evidence was 
required before a court could issue a mixed-motive jury instruction in 
an age discrimination case.218  In his petition for certiorari, Gross ar-
gued that the answer to this question had been expressly reserved in 
the Court’s earlier case of Desert Palace v. Costa219 and that there was a 
conflict in the circuits over whether direct evidence was required to 
obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-title VII case.220  In its brief 
opposing certiorari, FBL argued that the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
was consistent with both the ADEA text and the Court’s precedent 
and there was no reason to consider the question presented.221  It also 
argued that the cases Gross had discussed related to summary judg-
ment and were irrelevant to the question presented, which dealt with 
jury instructions.222  Finally, it argued that the Court should wait for a 
more suitable case for deciding the question presented, where the 
failure to use a mixed-motive instruction could have actually preju-
diced the plaintiff.223  At no point in its brief opposing certiorari did 
FBL argue that the burden of proof structure for a discrimination 
case should change or that Price Waterhouse did not govern ADEA cas-
es. 
 
216 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009). 
217 See Gross, 526 F.3d at 362. 
218 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346.  The question presented was as follows:  “Must a plaintiff 
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in 
a non-Title VII discrimination case?”  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 
2343 (No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099. 
219 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003).  The Court held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case was not re-
quired to present direct evidence in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction, but re-
served decision as to whether direct evidence would be required in a non-Title VII case.  
Id. 
220 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 218. 
221 See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Write of Certiorari, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-
441), 2008 WL 4824079 at *6–8. 
222 See id. at *9–17. 
223 See id. at *24. 
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Thus, Gross devoted his entire brief on the merits to arguing that 
the elevated evidentiary standard of direct evidence should not be 
required in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction.224  FBL, how-
ever, in its responding brief, raised an issue that was not contained 
within the clear and straightforward question presented to the Court; 
nor was it raised in opposition to the petition for certiorari.  FBL ar-
gued for the first time in its responding brief on the merits that the 
burden of persuasion should never be shifted to the employer in an 
age discrimination case and that Price Waterhouse should be overruled 
with respect to its application to the ADEA.225 
Heeding the respondent’s brief, the Court decided not to limit it-
self to the question it had granted certiorari to decide.  Rather, it de-
cided to change the law regarding proof in an age discrimination 
case.  Despite the fact that twenty years earlier the Court had deter-
mined in Price Waterhouse that discrimination “because of” sex did not 
mean that a plaintiff had to prove that the discrimination was the 
“but-for” cause of the adverse employment action, the Court in Gross 
reverted to that definition.226  It did this despite Congress having codi-
fied the meaning of “because of” under Title VII to mean that a 
plaintiff need only show that discrimination was “a motivating fac-
tor.”227 
In the past, the Court had repeatedly refused to address an issue 
which was not raised prior to the respondent’s merits brief.228  The 
important reason for this practice is that raising the issue so late in 
the process limits input by both the petitioner and interested amici.  
In Alabama v. Shelton,229 the Court emphasized this point in its refusal 
to follow respondent’s late request that it overrule two earlier deci-
sions: 
We do not entertain this contention, for Shelton first raised it in his brief 
on the merits.  We would normally expect notice of an intent to make so 
far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s opposition to a petition for 
certiorari, cf. this Court’s Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate prepara-
tion time for those likely affected and wishing to participate.230 
Nonetheless, in Gross, by agreeing to consider an issue not raised in 
the question presented, and not raised in the brief opposing the peti-
 
224 See generally Brief for Petitioner, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 208116. 
225 See generally Brief for Respondent, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 507026. 
226 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 20002-2(m) (2006). 
228 See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660 n.3 (2002); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ala-
bama, 526 U.S. 160, 171 (1999). 
229 See Shelton, 535 U.S. 654. 
230 See id. at 661 n.3. 
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tion for certiorari, the Court foreclosed the opportunity for amici, in-
cluding the U.S. Government and state attorneys general, to weigh in 
on the proper burden of proof in a non-Title VII discrimination 
case.231  The Court’s refusal to follow prudential court practice un-
derscores its failure to function properly as a court. 
Ultimately, the Court held that interpretation of the ADEA was 
not controlled by Price Waterhouse, a Title VII case, claiming that be-
cause the Price Waterhouse framework was difficult to apply, there was 
no benefit to extending it to ADEA claims.232  This holding changed 
the law abruptly, turning on its head a statutory interpretation that 
had been settled for decades.  As the dissent noted, “Justice Kenne-
dy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse assumed the plurality’s mixed-motives 
framework extended to the ADEA, and the Courts of Appeals to have 
considered the issue unanimously have applied Price Waterhouse to 
ADEA claims.”233 
The dissent took the Court to task both for its dictionary usage, 
and for its decision to interpret similar statutes differently.234  Justice 
 
231 In his Reply Brief, Gross argued that the Court should not engage in the unusual practice 
of deciding an issue that was first raised in respondent’s merits brief, noting that: 
Because respondent did not earlier indicate that it would challenge the holding in 
Price Waterhouse, the United States was deprived of an opportunity to address that 
important issue in its brief.  A decision to overrule the decision in Price Waterhouse 
would affect not only the ADEA but also the large number of federal and state laws 
that since 1989 have been construed to embody the allocation of the burden of 
proof set out in Price Waterhouse.  The decision in Price Waterhouse should not be re-
visited without affording to parties affected by a potential change in the interpre-
tation of those other laws—including the attorneys general of the states involved—
an opportunity to make their views known to this court. 
  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 210, at *2 (footnote omitted). 
232 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351–52 (2009).  The Court thus in essence 
overruled Price Waterhouse’s application to non-Title VII claims. 
233 See id. at 2354–55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  The Court’s holding that an 
ADEA plaintiff must always establish but-for discrimination has been and may continue to 
be extended by lower courts to other civil rights statutes.  For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has applied the rationale of Gross to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12111–12117 (2006).  See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th 
Cir. 2010).  Other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statues contain the same “be-
cause of” language as the ADEA, and may be interpreted the same way as Gross, include 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)); the anti-retaliation 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)); and the anti-retaliation provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
234 In reaching the conclusion that “because of” meant “but-for,” the Court used one textual-
ist interpretive method—referring to definitions in the dictionary.  See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 
2350.  The Court cited 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966), and 1 
Oxford English Dictionary 746 (1933).  See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (“defining ‘because 
of’ to mean ‘By reason of, on account of’”).  But surprisingly, the Court neglected anoth-
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Stevens noted that although the dictionaries used by the majority de-
fine “because of” as “by reason of” or “on account of,” they do not es-
tablish that “because of”  signifies but-for causation.235  The dictiona-
ries “do not . . . define ‘because of’ as ‘solely because of’ or ‘exclusively 
on account of.’”236  Justice Stevens further observed that “[i]n Price 
Waterhouse, we recognized that the words ‘because of’ do not mean 
‘solely because of,’ and we held that the inquiry ‘commanded by the 
words’ of the statute was whether gender was a motivating factor in 
the employment decision.”237  The dissent also pointed out that with 
respect to the interpretive method of construing similar language in 
similar statutes consistently, the relevant language in the ADEA and 
Title VII was identical: 
That the Court is construing the ADEA rather than Title VII does not jus-
tify this departure from precedent.  The relevant language in the two sta-
tutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations of 
Title VII’s language apply “with equal force in the context of age discrim-
ination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA ‘were derived in haec 
verba from Title VII.’”238 
The majority offered no explanation for its refusal to follow its own 
policy of interpreting identical language in two discrimination sta-
tutes as having the same meaning.  Nonetheless, it held that Congress 
meant something different in the ADEA and Title VII when it used 
 
er textualist method, which is to consider the meaning of the same words in a similar sta-
tute.  See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988) (finding that “substan-
tially justified” in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), meant “justi-
fied in the main,” based on  the meaning of “substantial” in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E), and the meaning of “substantially justified” in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 37(a)(4) and (b)(2)(E)); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 
U.S. 759, 769-70 (1988) (determining that the meaning of “material” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(a) should be determined by reference to how it was defined by other statutes deal-
ing with misrepresentations to public officers).  Of course, using that method would 
point up the absurdity of interpreting “because of” differently in statutes such as Title VII 
and the ADEA where the purpose is the same—to prevent discrimination—and the lan-
guage is the same, i.e., the employer cannot discriminate because of someone’s race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, or age.  Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added) (2006).  The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer 
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis add-
ed). 
235 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. at 2354 (citations omitted). 
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identical language prohibiting employers from discriminating “be-
cause of” a particular characteristic.  In making such an abrupt and 
unexplained departure from prior interpretations, the Court does 
not persuade that it is being honest with itself or with us about the 
considerations driving its decision. 
The Court’s policy preference carried out in Gross was to make it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail by placing a higher burden of 
proof on plaintiffs in non-Title VII cases.  To accomplish this goal, it 
reached out beyond the case properly before it, and violated its own 
rule about not hearing claims raised only in the respondent’s merits 
brief.  It thus created new law in disregard of traditional Supreme 
Court rules and practice, in disregard of fairness to the interested 
parties, in disregard of stare decisis, and in disregard of Congress’ 
purpose to eliminate discrimination.  Rather, the Court ignored any 
boundaries on its proper powers, either constitutional or prudential, 
and proceeded to engage in “an unabashed display of judicial law-
making.”239 
E.  Advisory Opinions 
Suppose the Court granted the writ of certiorari in a case and 
then decided not to consider the question presented but instead to 
consider another question not addressed by anything in the record of 
the case, by the lower courts, by the petition for certiorari or the brief 
opposing it, or by the briefs of the parties.  By deciding a question 
that the Court itself has created, and that stands completely apart 
from the litigation that brought the case to the Court, the Court 
moves toward the issuance of an advisory opinion.240  If it is an advi-
sory opinion, it would be beyond the justiciability requirements ne-
cessary for the Court to have jurisdiction.241 
 
239 See id. at 2358. 
240 There is, of course, an argument to be made that the question raised by the Court sua 
sponte was “a subsidiary question . . . fairly included in the question presented for re-
view.”  SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a).  The counter argument is that if the question was not litigated 
below, nor presented in the petition for certiorari, nor raised in the parties’ briefs, then a 
priori it was not a fairly included subsidiary question.  If the Court thinks there was an an-
tecedent question necessary for resolution of the case, it could dismiss the case as impro-
vidently granted, and await the next case where the issue is squarely presented.  Or, given 
the control it has over its certiorari jurisdiction, it would not have to grant certiorari to a 
case that does not raise the issues it thinks are important.  What the Court should not be 
doing is changing the case before it so it can change the law.  That is not its role within 
our constitutional structure. 
241 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 212(b)(iii), at p. 68 
(8th ed. 2009). 
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Compare the scenario above to the incident that led to the estab-
lishment of the advisory opinion rule in our constitutional jurispru-
dence—the request by then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to 
the Court to answer the question of the rights and obligations of the 
United States under treaties with France and England when they were 
at war.242  In both situations, the Court did not answer the question 
presented, but in our scenario it answered a different question, one 
that the Court itself raised sua sponte.  Although there were no par-
ties to a dispute before the Court in the Jefferson instance, in our 
scenario there was a controversy between two parties, but the issue 
the Court chose to decide was not in dispute between them.  Thus, 
the Court’s decision was arguably made outside of a genuine case or 
controversy, and was therefore an advisory opinion.  The question to 
be answered in this scenario is whether, in this situation, the Court 
has gone beyond its constitutional powers, and, if not, how close it is 
to the line, if there is a line. 
F.  Summary 
When the Court decides only the cases or controversies put before 
it by the parties, it plays its legitimate role in our constitutional struc-
ture.  A decision based on a record with thorough briefing and ar-
gument by the parties, with decisions taken on the issue by the lower 
courts, and with broad public participation through the amicus 
process is more likely to lead to decisions based on law rather than 
politics.  However, the Court acts as a super-legislature when it reach-
es beyond cases and controversies to make law.  Going beyond the 
case or controversy requirement also appears to lead the Court down 
the slippery slope to acting with no boundaries at all.  As seen in the 
cases above, when the Court has reached out for issues not put before 
it by the parties, it has also violated its own rules, failed to respect 
prudential judicial practices, and denied parties the right to a full 
and fair process.  This is more than judicial activism.  The Court is no 
longer acting as a court. 
III.  CAN THE SUPREME COURT’S CONDUCT BE LIMITED? 
The Supreme Court has made clear that it does not view deciding 
issues that have not been presented by litigants within an adversarial 
context as a violation of the case and controversy requirement.  For 
example, the Court noted in one case, “An order limiting the grant of 
 
242 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 54. 
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certiorari does not operate a jurisdictional bar.  We may consider 
questions outside the scope of the limited order when resolution of 
those questions is necessary for the proper disposition of the case.”243  
And of course, the Court determines what is necessary for the proper 
disposition of the case.  Thus, the Court essentially determines its 
own boundaries. 
Nonetheless, the case and controversy requirement does place 
some limits on the judiciary’s power.  Whatever different views one 
might have about the Constitution’s grant of judicial power, there is 
no basis for arguing that it is without limits.244  The judiciary is one 
branch in our system of separation of powers, and that system should 
limit the Court to its judicial role.  Moreover, it is certainly question-
able whether limits on the Court’s role should be largely determined 
by the Court itself.  Although Congress clearly has power to place lim-
its on the Court’s powers,245 to date it has largely cooperated in giving 
the Court maximum discretion in how it conducts its business.246  In 
the 70’s and 80’s Congress gave the Court much more control over its 
docket by repealing four different statutes which had authorized di-
rect appeals from district courts,247 and by repealing in 1988 “the last 
remnant of the Court’s once-flourishing appeal jurisdiction over 
judgments of the federal courts of appeals.”248  Thus, except in a very 
few cases, the Court has been given complete discretion over its 
docket, because it will only hear those cases in which it determines to 
grant certiorari.249  In addition, at the same time that the Court 
gained virtually total control of its docket, it also reduced the total 
number of cases it agreed to hear.250  Perhaps this has pushed the 
 
243 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
244 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 74 (2009) (stating that even for those 
most cynical about the doctrine of separation of powers, “[t]here is some point at which 
the Constitution will be found to prohibit the delegation of purely legislative authority to 
the Supreme Court”). 
245 See infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 662  (eliminating de facto the Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction); Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall 
have the power to proscribe general rules of practice and procedure.”); Judiciary Act of 
1925, 43 Stat. 936 (granting the Court control over most of its work); see also CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 7 (7th ed. 2011) (stating that 
the Judiciary Act of 1925 was known as the “Judges’ Bill” because a committee composed 
of Supreme Court Justices drafted it). 
247 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, § 2.7, at 90 (9th ed. 2007). 
248 Id. at § 2.2, at 78. 
249 The number of direct appeals from both one and three judge district courts went from 
211 in the 1971 term, to two in the 2004 term.  See id. at § 2.7, at  91. 
250 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM:  DATA DECISIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 75 tbl. 2-8 (3d ed. 2003); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the 
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Court to try to extend the boundaries of the cases that come before 
it, because it decides so few of them.251  However, even if the Court is 
attempting to issue very broad decisions in the few cases it hears, it 
should nonetheless not step out of its role as a court when it does so.  
In the cases discussed in this Article, the flaws in the Court’s process 
resulted from its disregard both of the structural limitations imposed 
by separation of powers and its own prudential practices.  When the 
Court reached out for issues not in dispute between the parties, and 
therefore not arising out of the adversary system, and decided these 
issues without a record below, without opinions of lower courts, and 
in some cases without briefing or arguing by the parties, it was not 
fulfilling its proper judicial role.  As will be discussed below, both as-
pirational and practical steps can be taken to help limit the Court’s 
conduct and to try to ensure that it acts within constitutional bounda-
ries. 
A.  The Problem 
As the final arbiter of constitutional decisions, the Court might 
seem to be above the law when it comes to determinations as to the 
propriety of its own conduct, particularly concerning its constitution-
al decisions.  Decisions interpreting statutes can, of course, be over-
turned by Congress, but it is complex and in some instances impossi-
ble to counter a Supreme Court finding that a statute, or a part of it, 
is unconstitutional, as in Citizens United.  Thus, what can be done if 
the Court does not adhere to the constitutional structure, and in the 
process ignores prudential practices and its own rules?  In such a 
case, the Court appears to be a political body beyond any control or 
accountability.  This perception is damaging to the Court as an insti-
tution and to a representative democracy that is supposedly built on a 
structure of checks and balances among the separate branches.  A 
lack of control raises the spectre of the question Judge Posner asked 
about judges who function as a political rather than a judicial branch:  
“[W]hat prevents the descent of the judiciary into an abyss of un-
channeled discretionary justice that would render law so uncertain 
and unpredictable that it would no longer be law but instead would 
 
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and 
Its Shrinking Docket:  The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2006). 
251 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 59 (2009) (“[T]he Court must make the most of the cases it does hear by issuing broad 
decisions that govern a number of future cases in the lower federal and state courts.”). 
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be the exercise of raw political power by politicians called judges?”252  
It is to avoid this abyss that controls are needed. 
B.  Judging the Judges 
One potential source of control of judicial conduct is public opi-
nion.  It is important for the Court as an institution that it be held in 
high regard by the public.253  Because the Court has to depend upon 
other branches of government to enforce the laws as it has inter-
preted or declared them, its stature and its power derive to some ex-
tent from the good will and sense of justice of the public and its rep-
resentatives.254  The Court’s high stature derives in large part from the 
public’s belief that the Court is doing its job, acting in the best inter-
est of the country, and supporting the rule of law.  But what standards 
are available to the bench and bar, much less to the general public, to 
consider the quality of judges, and to understand the appropriateness 
of their conduct and their decisions? 
The role of judges and the work of judging is increasingly ex-
amined through interdisciplinary studies involving psychology, politi-
cal science, behavioral economics, as well as other fields.255  Theories 
abound as to what judges should be doing and how their decisions 
should be made.  The dominant normative legal theories of conse-
quentialism (predominantly law and economics) and deontology 
(rights-based notions of liberty and equality) have a new competitor 
arising out of the field of virtue ethics—aretaic or virtue-centered 
theory—which is based on Aristotelian concepts of virtue and excel-
lence.256  Contrary to Posner’s position that there is no moral dimen-
 
252 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 372. 
253 See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:  Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 634 (2009) (“[Judge] Richard 
Arnold [U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit] observed that ‘the courts, like the 
rest of the government, depend on the consent of the governed,’ and they need often to 
be reminded of that dependence.” (citation omitted)). 
254 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1017 (2009) 
(“[T]he Court’s interpretations of the Constitution must be likely to be accepted and en-
forced by at least a critical mass of the officials normally counted on to implement judi-
cial decisions, and they should not trigger a strong and enduring sense of mass outrage 
by political majorities that the Court has overstepped its constitutional powers.” (citations 
omitted)). 
255 See Paul Horwitz, Judicial Character (and Does It Matter):  Constitutional Conscience:  The 
Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision, H. Jefferson Powell; How Judges Think, Richard A 
Posner; Judgment Calls:  Principle and Politics In Constitutional Law, Daniel A. Farber & 
Suzanna Sherry, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98 (2009) (Book Review). 
256 See Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE, 1–23 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008). 
206 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
sion to a judge’s decision,257 these new normative legal theories focus 
on judicial character and on a moral dimension of judging.  The vir-
tue-centered theory of judging is grounded in judicial excellence258 
and “requires the selection of judges who possess the judicial vir-
tues—civic courage, judicial temperament, judicial intelligence, wis-
dom, and above all justice.”259 
Like other normative theories (whose ability to actually affect 
judicial conduct appears quite limited),260 the virtue-centered theory 
may not itself contribute to curbing judicial discretion.  Nonetheless, 
virtue theory does provide a matrix of qualities for evaluating judges 
and the decisions they make.  By providing a clearer theory of how to 
judge the judges, a virtue-centered theory could help change the 
public’s view of what judges should be doing.  As H. Jefferson Powell 
concluded in his book, Constitutional Conscience, The Moral Dimension of 
Judicial Decision, 
constitutional decision is an ethical activity, one that demands individual 
moral choices by the interpreter . . . . There is no escape, not even in 
theory, from the problem of how to play the game fairly, no set of deter-
minate, substantive principles that are somehow the unwritten meaning 
of the Constitution, adherence to which validates one’s choices in consti-
tutional decision making.  There is no escape, not even for legal instru-
mentalists such as Judge Posner, from individual moral responsibility in 
constitutional law.261 
Powell also lists judicial virtues he considers critical to the process 
of judging:  humility about the Court’s role, acquiescence in past 
judicial interpretations (stare decisis), integrity, and candor.262  He 
considers integrity and candor as linked and as indispensable consti-
 
257 See POSNER, supra note 34, at 307–12 (explaining that a decision taking sides on a moral 
issue is a political decision); see also POWELL, supra note 3, at 9 (“Posner’s view of law as a 
morally neutral tool for the achievement of goals set by wholly extralegal considerations is 
widely shared.”). 
258 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 
486 (2005). 
259 Id. at 478.  As Colin Farrelly and Larry Solum explain in the introduction to their anthol-
ogy, virtue ethics transplanted into legal theory holds that “the final end of law is to pro-
mote human flourishing—to enable humans to lead excellent lives.”  See FARRELLY & 
SOLUM, supra note 256, at 2.  Moreover, virtue jurisprudence is guided by the process of 
phronesis, or “practical wisdom.”  See Lawrence B. Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equi-
ty and the Rule of Law, 142–62, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 256. 
260 See supra notes 33 and 34; see also Fallon, supra note 254, at 1013 (“Constitutional theories 
hold endless interest for law professors.  Interestingly, however, the justices themselves 
appear less preoccupied with constitutional theory as they go about their workaday busi-
ness of resolving constitutional controversies.”). 
261 POWELL, supra note 3, at 107. 
262 See id. 
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tutional virtues.263  By candor, he means the Justices must “be clear 
about why they give the answers they do.  Candor is indispensable if 
the system is to retain its moral dignity.”264 
Powell also focuses on the judicial oath, as Chief Justice Marshall 
did in Marbury v. Madison.265  The requirement of the oath, according 
to Powell, links a judge’s personal conscience and obligations as a 
moral actor to the obligations that arise from the exercise of the 
power of judicial review.266  It implicates the judge in the moral di-
mension of judicial decision-making.267 
Although this is a very brief sketch of a virtue-based theory of 
judging, it provides one metric for considering the actions of the Su-
preme Court majority in the cases discussed above.  It offers a pers-
pective to consider whether the Justices are acting appropriately as a 
court, or whether they have gone far afield from proper judicial con-
duct.  How does the current majority measure up under a moral di-
mension of judging?  To what extent do members of that majority 
exemplify the constitutional virtues of humility, acquiescence, integri-
ty and candor, or the characteristics of an excellent judge—civic cou-
rage, judicial temperament, judicial intelligence, wisdom, and con-
cern for justice? 
If the constitutional virtues and judicial qualities set forth above 
are applied to the conduct of the majority of the Justices in the cases 
discussed in this Article, one could fairly conclude that these Justices 
 
263 See id. at 88–89. 
264 See id. at 90.  For emphasis on importance of judicial candor, see also Allison Siegler & 
Barry Sullivan, “‘Death Is Different’ No Longer”:  Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth 
Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 379–80 (“[I]t is essen-
tial to our system of judicial review that judges not just give reasons for their decisions, 
but that the reasons they give be the true reasons for their decisions . . . . [J]udges neces-
sarily have choices to make, and, at the end of the day, it is how those choices are made, 
and how they are explained, that matters.”). 
265 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 453, each justice or judge of the United States 
shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his or her of-
fice: 
I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without re-
spect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
me as ________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States.  So help me 
God. 
266 See POWELL, supra note 3, at 3. 
267 See Horwitz, supra note 255, at 163–64 (“[T]he judicial oath, and the formalities attendant 
upon swearing it, ties the judge’s character intimately to his or her office, rendering every 
decision in office both one that has official weight and must be undertaken consistently 
with the judge’s official duties, and one that has about it a sense of personal moral obliga-
tion.  Properly understood and seriously considered, the oath can be a forceful reminder 
of what virtuous judging demands.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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can be found lacking.  Certainly, they lacked humility when they dis-
regarded the constitutional structure that limits their judicial power 
to the review of cases or controversies and reached out to decide is-
sues that were not before them in the four cases discussed herein.  
Moreover, they lacked “acquiescence,” when they overruled cases in 
Citizens United (McConnell and Austin), Iqbal (Bivens supervisory re-
sponsibility), Montejo (Jackson), and Gross (Price Waterhouse as applied 
to age discrimination cases), and particularly since they did so by de-
ciding issues that were not brought before them by the parties.  They 
lacked integrity and candor when they claimed implausibly that a de-
cision was “passed upon below” when it was not, as they did in Citizens 
United.  They lacked wisdom and concern for justice when they de-
cided an issue without a record below, as they did in Citizens United, 
and when they decided an issue that had been conceded below and 
did not permit the issue to be briefed or argued, as in Iqbal, and when 
they broke the Court’s own rule about not considering an issue raised 
only in respondent’s merits brief, thereby denying participation of 
amici, as they did in Gross.  The conduct engaged in by the majority 
of the Justices in these four cases shows that they lacked basic and 
important judicial characteristics.  Such conduct can only reinforce 
the public’s image of the members of the Court as “politicians in 
robes.” 
Nonetheless, public opinion appears to be important to the 
Court.  Although its conduct suggests that the Court is quite political 
and ideological, the majority also takes pains to look like it is not.  
Thus, the Justices pay lip service to prudential practices and claim 
they have not overruled cases they have clearly gutted.268  Barry 
Friedman points out how the Roberts Court has chosen a path of 
“stealth overruling.”269  For example, the Court in a series of cases has 
essentially overruled Miranda v. Arizona but has not declared that it 
has done so.270  The Court accomplished this by speaking to different 
audiences simultaneously in the same opinion.271  It made clear to 
lower courts and to the police that Miranda will not be enforced, 
while leaving the public, which highly approves of the Miranda rule, 
in the misguided belief that Miranda is still the law.272 
Miranda is a very good example of such stealth overruling, but 
there are many others.  The Court did the same thing in cases lead-
 
268 See Friedman, supra note 8. 
269 See id. at 3–5. 
270 See id. at 5, 42, 52–53. 
271 See id. at 5. 
272 See id. 
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ing up to Iqbal, Montejo, Gross, and Citizens United.  It cut away at the 
various supporting doctrines, so that by the time it got to each of 
these cases, it did not require a very big step to do what it did.  Thus, 
by sequencing its decisions to make them appear less activist, the 
Court has attempted to avoid negative public reaction.273  The Justices 
occasionally misjudge.  As Professor Friedman noted, the Court ap-
parently was surprised by the public outcry against Citizens United274 
because earlier, in a prior case that had largely passed unnoticed, FEC 
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,275 it had already gutted much of the 
McConnell case, which it then overruled in Citizens United. 
Stealth overruling is at odds with transparency, predictability, and 
proper judicial conduct.  Yet precisely because it tends to obfuscate 
what appears to be a deliberate law-making agenda by the majority, it 
is more difficult to challenge head-on.  Part of the difficulty in raising 
a challenge to the Court’s conduct as going beyond the proper role 
of a court is that the decisions the Court produces frequently obscure 
what it is actually doing.  There is a lot of intelligence put to the ser-
vice of the Court’s agenda.  The Justices themselves are very intelli-
gent, highly trained, and quite skillful at legal argument.  In addition, 
they hire some of the brightest young minds in the country as clerks 
to do their bidding.276  So in the service of carrying out an agenda, the 
Justices are skilled at using smoke and mirrors, and at writing opi-
nions in which they claim to be following standard interpretative and 
prudential judicial practices when they are not.277  As a result, the 
general public, not to mention many in the legal community, may 
 
273 See id. at 31–32.  Perhaps because the court had incrementally cut back on precedent, it 
found it easy to take a final step by reaching beyond the boundaries of the case before it. 
274 See id. at 11–12, 32; id. at 38 (“[Citizens United] looks very much like a case of miscalcula-
tion.”); see also Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive:  Did the Roberts Court 
Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2242557 (discussing the possibility that Court misjudged the 
reaction to its decision in Citizens United). 
275 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
276 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 286 (“[A] Supreme Court Justice—however questiona-
ble his position in a particular case might seem to be—can, without lifting a pen or touch-
ing the computer keyboard, but merely by whistling for his law clerks, assure himself that 
he can defend whatever position he wants to take with enough professional panache to 
keep the critics at bay.”). 
277 In 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the Court claimed to rely on the statutory text of the ADEA and 
the NLRA in reaching its decision and in claiming that its interpretation carried out the 
will of Congress.  See 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1466 (2009).  However, nothing in the texts of the 
two statutes supported the Court’s view.  Rather, “[t]he Court’s approach is to articulate 
its policy preference despite the absence of any textual support, and then interpret ab-
sence in the text to mean its policy prevails.”  See Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textual-
ism:  Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 834–
36 (2010). 
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not be aware of the degree to which the Court is disregarding consti-
tutional structure and traditional judicial practices. 
An example of a deceptive rationale provided by the Court can be 
seen in Citizens United.  Even though the issue of facial validity had 
been expressly abandoned below by the parties, the Roberts Court 
majority claimed that its review of the issue was appropriate.  Howev-
er, under its own Rule 14.1(a),278 only questions set forth in the peti-
tion for certiorari or fairly included there can be considered by the 
Court.279  The Court had clearly stated in earlier cases that “it is only 
in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that ques-
tions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed”280 and it is “‘on-
ly in the most exceptional cases’ that we will consider issues outside 
the questions presented.”281 
In an attempt to fit the procedural facts within its rules, the major-
ity in Citizens United claimed the issue had been “passed upon” be-
low.282  Its reasoning was as follows:  The issue of facial validity was 
properly before the Court because the district court had considered 
the issue at an earlier point in time before the parties expressly aban-
doned it, and the district court’s later opinion was based on the rea-
soning of the prior opinion.283  Although at first blush this rationale 
may sound reasonable, it is in fact quite disingenuous.  Because the 
parties had abandoned the issue of facial validity—they expressly sti-
pulated to the dismissal of that claim—the district court’s “later opi-
nion” that the Court referred to had not considered facial validity at 
all because the claim did not exist at that point in time.  Thus, the 
district court could not possibly have relied upon anything in a prior 
decision regarding the issue of facial validity because the issue itself 
was not before it.  In the district court’s final decision that went up on 
appeal, there was no issue of facial validity, and therefore it had not 
been “passed upon.”  Moreover, neither the litigants nor the Court 
made any argument, nor could they, that there was an exceptional 
factor that made it proper for the issue of facial validity to be consi-
dered.  Instead, as the dissent bitterly noted, “[e]ssentially, five Justi- 
ces were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so 
 
278 SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a).  For pertinent text, see supra note 31. 
279 See id. 
280 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 932 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
281 See id. 
282 Id. at 892. 
283 See id. at 893. 
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they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change 
the law.”284 
The Justices’ failure to provide decisions that offer clear, persua-
sive and transparent reasoning, to engage in traditional prudential 
practices, including following the Court’s own rules, to be honest 
about the considerations driving their decisions, and to conform to 
the constitutional structure by deciding only cases or controversies 
brought to them by litigants, should raise red flags with the public.  
People at any location on the political spectrum should be quite 
troubled by the Court’s disregard of any boundaries on its role as a 
court.  We the people should make our voices heard. 
C.  What Congress Should Do 
One way members of the public can make their voices heard is 
through their representatives in Congress.  Although it is always diffi-
cult to get any action through Congress, and especially in recent 
times, Congress should be concerned that its law-making power is be-
ing undermined.  The Court is intruding on congressional preroga-
tives on a rather regular basis when it reaches out for issues not legi-
timately before it in order to legislate by striking down existing laws 
and making its own new laws, as seen in the cases discussed above.  
The structure of the Constitution counsels against unlimited judicial 
power. 
Congress has the power to pass laws governing the appellate juris-
diction of the Court.285  Pursuant to the Exceptions Clause of Article 
III, it could enact legislation that would make the boundary line re-
garding the cases and controversies requirement much brighter, spel-
ling out more clearly the limitation on the Court’s ability to change 
the issues in the cases brought to it by litigants.286  Case law since the 
19th century has supported Congress’s right to limit the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.287  Many scholars believe that Congress 
has significant, if not plenary, power under the Exceptions Clause to 
 
284 Id. at 932 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
285 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
286 The Constitution provides that the conferral of appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme 
Court is subject to “such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall 
make.”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
287 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (dismissing McCardle’s appeal on the basis that 
the Court no longer had jurisdiction after Congress had repealed a provision of an act 
granting habeas corpus). 
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limit the Court’s jurisdiction.288  Many others believe there are also 
limitations on Congress’s power.289  Much of the scholarship on the 
Exceptions Clause deals with the extent to which Congress could strip 
the Court of jurisdiction, particularly of jurisdiction to decide certain 
types of cases.290  This Article does not propose that Congress should 
strip the Court of jurisdiction of any particular kind of case, but ra-
ther that Congress should use its power to shore up the structural li-
mitations on the judiciary set forth in Article III. 
Scholars have discussed a number of steps Congress could take to 
try to add some controls to the Court’s unbounded discretion and 
lack of accountability.291  As one recent example, Paul Carrington and 
Roger Cramton have proposed a way to help transform the Supreme 
Court from its current role as a super-legislature into a true court.292  
They would limit the Court’s discretion with respect to granting cer-
tiorari by restructuring the current certiorari process.293  Instead of 
having the judges’ law clerks in charge of this process, a panel of ex-
perienced federal judges would review and determine which certiora-
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macy and Article III, 96 GEO. L. J. 59, 64 (2007); Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdic-
tion:  Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003, 1009 
(2006); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise In-
ferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1500–01 (2000). 
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292 Carrington & Cramton, supra note 253, at 634. 
293 See id. at 636. 
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ri petitions must be granted and therefore which cases the Court 
must hear.294  The panel would make its decisions in accordance with 
standards determined by Congress.295  Carrington and Cramton see 
the restructuring of the certiorari process as one way to restore and 
rehabilitate the judicial function and reduce an excess of judicial in-
dependence.296 
This Article proposes that Congress should enact legislation that 
would give teeth to the case and controversy requirement.297  For ex-
ample, in a case where the Court wanted to decide issues which had 
not been litigated below, Congress could impose one or more specific 
requirements.  First, the Court could be required to dismiss a case as 
improvidently granted unless the issues to be decided were supported 
by a full record below, were the subject of lower court decisions, had 
been briefed and argued by the parties, and had had the opportunity 
for amicus participation.  In that instance, the Court would have to 
await the next case before deciding the issue it preferred to decide.  
Second, the Court could be required to send the case back to the trial 
court for the development of a record on the issue it believed neces-
sary to resolve the case.  As a third possibility, the Court could be re-
quired to propose a new question presented and ask for briefs and 
argument by the parties and amici. 
The stronger alternatives for Congress to adopt are the first two 
listed above.  These requirements would appear to more significantly 
limit the Court to its role within an adversarial system, by ensuring 
that the issues it decides are based on a record below and lower court 
decisions.  The third possibility is probably the weakest option, be-
cause it would still permit the Court to decide issues without there be-
ing a record below or decisions by lower court judges.  It is also a me-
thod that the Court already uses, but not consistently, as seen in the 
Iqbal case.  In Iqbal, the Court did not allow briefing or arguing or 
participation by amici on the issue of supervisory responsibility under 
Bivens.298  Thus, making this alternative a requirement would ensure 
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297 As Chief Justice Ellsworth noted in an early case, Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. 321, 327 
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298 See Aschroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have re-
ceived no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability, much less the 
full-dress argument we normally require.”). 
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that the Court could not simply choose an issue and decide it without 
the opportunity for the parties and amici to brief and argue the ques-
tion. 
Although any law Congress would enact to shore up the constitu-
tional structure would be subject to interpretation by the Court,  
nonetheless, it would focus more attention on the expectation that 
the Court could not easily change the case before it so that it could 
change the law.  Congress could and should take steps to ensure that 
our independent judiciary is not so independent that it is accounta-
ble to no one.  If there are no checks and balances, and no controls 
on separation of powers, then the Supreme Court becomes a law un-
to itself and descends into the abyss of unchanneled discretionary jus-
tice, where law is simply the exercise of raw political power. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States is a very important 
branch of the government.  The current path of the Roberts Court, 
however, risks undermining not only the public’s respect for the 
Court but also its respect for the rule of law.  When members of the 
Court act like “politicians in robes,” who overstep the proper boun-
daries of the constitutional structure regarding the role of the judi-
ciary, when a majority of the Justices ignore their own rules and pru-
dential practices, when they do not respect long-held judicial 
traditions about the way cases should be decided, they need to be 
called to account.  Judicial power in a constitutional democracy is not 
boundless, and Justices should not roam at will.  Congress should ex-
ercise its power under the Exceptions Clause to clarify the outer 
boundaries of the Court’s power by limiting the Court’s ability to 
reach out for issues that are not grounded in the adversary process.  
The Supreme Court is too important to be left to its own devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
